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N Michigan, running a betting pool on the Super Bowl will get 
you hard time in prison. Operating a Super Bowl pool in Ne-
vada, by contrast, is perfectly legal, as long as you have the proper 
license. Indeed, Nevada’s economy benefits enormously from a 
multi-million dollar state-licensed sports betting industry.1 Of 
course, the fact that an activity is legal in one state but not another 
is in itself hardly shocking; ours is a federalist system of govern-
ment that affords significant regulatory authority to the states. But 
what is, or at least should be, eyebrow-raising is that this conduct 
violates federal law in some states, but not in others. Pursuant to 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
(“Sports Protection Act”),2 running a sports betting scheme is 
categorically prohibited by federal law in forty-six states, but not in 
Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, or Montana.3
I 
And there is nothing that the forty-six constrained states can do 
about it. The Sports Protection Act does not merely regulate pri-
vate conduct; it curtails the regulatory and revenue-raising author-
ity of the states. It precludes non-exempted states from legalizing 
sports gambling or running state-sponsored lotteries that tie their 
1 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563; 
Anthony N. Cabot & Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era, 5 
Chap. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2002). 
2 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 
(2000). 
3 See id. § 3704. The statute does not actually refer to these states by name. Rather, 
it provides that the sports betting ban does not apply to any scheme that was legal 
under state law prior to the introduction of the federal legislation, as long as legal 
gambling actually took place in that state before the federal ban. See id.; H. Wayne 
Clark, Jr., Who’s In? The Bona Fide Future of Office Pools, 8 Gaming L. Rev. 202, 
204 (2004) (suggesting that a few state laws authorizing office pools may also have 
been grandfathered in by the Sports Protection Act); I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and 
the Law: Internet Gambling: Statutes and International Law, SE81 ALI-ABA 231, 
242–44 (2000) (listing other state-authorized gambling schemes that may have been 
grandfathered in by the Sports Protection Act). No state is completely exempt from 
the federal proscription; each exempted state may continue only those forms of sports 
gambling that were legal and practiced prior to the federal legislation. Thus, Nevada 
is precluded from creating a sports-based lottery (as it allowed only casino sports 
gambling prior to the federal ban), and Oregon is precluded from introducing casino 
sports books (as it ran only a sports-based lottery scheme). See 138 Cong. Rec. 12,973 
(1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
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payoffs to the outcome of sporting events.4 Thus, Oregon and 
Delaware may run these popular and highly lucrative lotteries, but 
other states may not.5 Similarly, Nevada may derive enormous fi-
nancial benefits from casino sports book betting, but other states 
may not.6
In the months immediately preceding the passage of this stat-
ute—during which many states were faced with severe budget 
shortfalls7—a large number of states, including Florida and Cali-
fornia, were actively considering implementing sports-based state 
lotteries or otherwise legalizing some form of sports betting as a 
way to make ends meet.8 The express purpose of the Sports Protec-
tion Act was to preclude those states from carrying out their plans. 
As the Senate Report explains, Congress wanted “to stop the 
spread of State-sponsored sports gambling.”9 “Once a State legal-
izes sports gambling,” notes the report, “it will be extremely diffi-
cult for other States to resist the lure. The current pressures in such 
places as New Jersey and Florida to institute casino-style sports 
gambling illustrate the point.”10 Lamenting that “[w]ithout Federal 
legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal basis 
and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum,”11 Congress 
stepped in to stem the tide. 
The Sports Protection Act has achieved its goal.12 Today, as the 
states are once again faced with profound budget crises, there is 
4 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704. 
5 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 10 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3561. 
6 See id. at 10, 12, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3561, 3563. 
7 See Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the Do, Re, Mi”: The Commerce Clause 
and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 147, 171 (1993). 
8 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556; 
138 Cong. Rec. 12,972 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); Sen. Bill Bradley, The 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind Senate 
Bill 474, 2 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 5, 8 n.12 (1992). 
9 S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555. 
10 Id. at 5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556. 
11 Id.. 
12 In recent years, numerous bills have been proposed in Congress to close the “Las 
Vegas loophole” created by the Sports Protection Act, but these bills seek to place 
Nevada on the same ground as the rest of the states only with regard to betting on 
amateur sports; they do not purport to challenge Nevada’s federally granted monop-
oly on professional sports gambling. See Aaron J. Slavin, Comment, The “Las Vegas 
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nothing that a state like Michigan can do if it decides that it wants 
to compete with Nevada in the casino sports book business or if it 
decides that it wants to increase revenue with an NFL-based lot-
tery; it is required by federal law to stay completely out of the lu-
crative sports betting arena.13
Is this law constitutional? The Supreme Court would likely say 
that it is. Employing a straightforward textual reading of the 
Commerce Clause,14 and contrasting that clause with the plain lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Clause15 and the Tax Uniformity Clause16—
both of which expressly mandate uniform regulation—the Court 
has repeated time and time again in recent years (though it has 
never squarely held) that Congress is not constrained by a re-
quirement to legislate uniformly among the states in its exercise of 
the commerce power.17 Thus, according to the Court, Congress is 
Loophole” and the Current Push in Congress Towards a Blanket Prohibition on Col-
legiate Sports Gambling, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 715, 720 (2002). 
13 Of the forty-six states that were not afforded some form of exemption from the 
federal ban, only one—New Jersey—was given an opportunity to legalize sports gam-
bling. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3); Rose, supra note 3, at 242. Included within the 
Sports Protection Act was a peculiar provision affording New Jersey one year in 
which to legalize sports betting in Atlantic City. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3); Rose, su-
pra note 3, at 242. This provision did not mention New Jersey by name; rather, it af-
forded a one-year window of opportunity to authorize sports gambling in any munici-
pality in which there had been continuous casino gambling for the past ten years 
“pursuant to a comprehensive system of State regulation authorized by that State’s 
constitution and applicable solely to such municipality.” 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3). Of 
course, Congress knew full well that only Atlantic City fell into that cramped statu-
tory category. Congress inserted this provision into the law “to assuage the state of 
New Jersey’s Atlantic City casino lobbyists.” Thomas J. Ostertag, From Shoeless Joe 
to Charley Hustle: Major League Baseball’s Continuing Crusade Against Sports 
Gambling, 2 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 19, 20 n.4 (1992). Due largely to the political influ-
ence of Senator Bradley, one of the federal bill’s principal sponsors, see id. at 20 n.3, 
New Jersey declined to exercise this option. See also Dan Caesar, Sports Books in St. 
Louis? No Chance, Says a 1992 Law, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 12, 2001, at 36 
(quoting Professor I. Nelson Rose). 
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
15 Id. § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
16 Id. § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises” but requiring that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States”). This clause is usually referred to simply as the Uniformity 
Clause. 
17 See infra note 36. 
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free to enact commercial regulations that apply in some states, but 
not in others, or that explicitly treat some states differently than 
others. 
This Article will seek to call that conclusion into question. De-
spite the nonchalance with which the Court has pronounced and 
restated its current rule, it is in fact quite a radical thing to suggest, 
based on nothing more than a superficial textual analysis, that the 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to discriminate between 
the states. That suggestion does not, I submit, stand up to more 
searching scrutiny. 
In Part I, I will review the modern cases articulating the lack of a 
uniformity constraint on the commerce power and criticize the cur-
rent doctrine as the product of a perfunctory textual analysis of a 
type wholly unsuited to constitutional decisionmaking. 
Part II will briefly explore the notion of uniformity in constitu-
tional law, examining the various types of uniformity that might be 
expected from federal laws and the various rationales for seeking 
them. It will explain that uniformity can serve the goals of both ef-
ficiency and nondiscrimination. 
Part III will approach the question from an historical perspec-
tive—an inquiry that paints a picture very different from the one 
depicted by the current doctrine. Uniformity may be forgotten to-
day, but its importance to the framing generation cannot be over-
stated. The desire for uniform regulation of commerce was perhaps 
the single biggest catalyst for the Constitutional Convention. The 
states were unable to coordinate their trade policies to counter the 
protectionist actions of foreign nations; instead, they undercut each 
other’s efforts and bickered incessantly among themselves, to the 
virtual ruin of American shipping. For that reason, there was a 
near-universal consensus both before and during the Federal Con-
vention that the federal government should be invested with the 
power to enact a single uniform set of commercial regulations. 
And more importantly, the need for uniformity was not simply 
the precipitating factor in the creation of the federal commerce 
power; it was also considered to be a fundamental limitation upon 
that power. Many delegates to the Convention—particularly those 
from the Southern states—feared that Congress would use the 
commerce power as a means of discriminating in favor of some 
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states at the expense of others. Thus, the Southern states proposed, 
and the Convention ratified, a provision intended to preclude 
Congress from enacting nonuniform regulations of commerce. For 
purely stylistic reasons, that provision was ultimately broken into 
two different clauses, the Port Preference Clause18 and the Uni-
formity Clause, but the Framers understood those clauses to be 
one in purpose, and to have the combined effect of categorically 
prohibiting the nonuniform exercise of the commerce power. Had 
the Constitution been understood to provide otherwise, it is likely 
that it would never have been proposed, let alone ratified. 
Yet today, the Supreme Court has reached the exact opposite 
conclusion. For a Court that purports to care so much about 
originalism to articulate and stand by a principle so utterly oblivi-
ous to history is curious to say the least. In Part IV, I will explore 
how this curiosity came to pass—how the Court lost sight of such a 
fundamental historical principle. As it turns out, the Court’s mod-
ern rule is not the product of a principled turn from history and 
precedent. Quite the contrary, it is the result of nothing more than 
sloppy decisionmaking. 
That conclusion, in turn, presents the crucial question, which I 
will address in Part V: What, if anything, should be done to bridge 
the gap between the Framers’ intent to create a uniformity con-
straint on the commerce power and the modern Court’s conclusion 
that no such constraint exists? 
Much is at stake in the answer to that question, for Congress’s 
nonuniform regulation of commerce goes well beyond the idiosyn-
cratic world of sports betting. In recent years, Congress has regu-
lated nonuniformly through the commerce power in countless ar-
eas touching on all facets of modern life, from tax law to 
environmental law and criminal law. If the Court’s conclusion that 
there is no uniformity constraint on the commerce power is wrong, 
then a great many federal statutes are constitutionally suspect. 
Stepping back even further, the question of whether we should 
revive the forgotten historical consensus begs a more fundamental 
18 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Ves-
sels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in an-
other.”). 
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inquiry into the proper role of history and text in constitutional in-
terpretation. In particular, this inquiry reveals an unheralded 
downside to modern originalism; emphasizing the original meaning 
of the text over the original understanding of the Framers has 
many virtues, to be sure, but also runs the risk of undermining core 
constitutional values that are, for insubstantial reasons, imperfectly 
reflected in the text. 
Part V will argue that the uniformity constraint on the com-
merce power is just such a core constitutional value. Because the 
Framers narrowly conceived the commerce power as extending 
only to the imposition of excises and duties and the regulation of 
navigation and shipping, the decision to divide the mandate against 
the nonuniform regulation of commerce into two more narrowly 
drawn clauses was, in the minds of the Framers, inconsequential. 
The Uniformity Clause, which requires all excises and duties to be 
uniform throughout the United States, and the Port Preference 
Clause, which precludes Congress from enacting regulations of 
navigation or shipping that favor the ports of one state over those 
of another, were sufficient in their day to fully protect against the 
nonuniform exercise of the commerce power. In today’s world, 
however—a world in which the commerce power has achieved a 
drastically broader ambit—if we continue to read the Uniformity 
Clause and the Port Preference Clause narrowly and literally, and 
if we fail to imply a general uniformity constraint on the commerce 
power, then we fatally undermine the fundamental constitutional 
principle that pervaded the Constitutional Convention, that Con-
gress must not be permitted to use the commerce power to favor 
some states at the expense of others. Part V will contend that we 
should interpret the Constitution in a manner that preserves this 
fundamental precept and ensures that it remains relevant and vital 
in the twenty-first century and beyond. 
Finally, Part VI will explain that reviving the general uniformity 
constraint on the federal commerce power, though it would call 
into question a number of federal statutes, would not have unac-
ceptably dire consequences for the corpus juris. If the courts were 
to recognize a uniformity limitation in the Commerce Clause, the 
vast majority of federal laws enacted pursuant to the commerce 
power that can be said to discriminate in some sense between 
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states would not be struck down. Federal acts that regulate in neu-
tral terms but naturally burden some states more than others—by, 
for instance, imposing environmental constraints on coal mining—
would not violate the uniformity principle. Nor would laws that in-
corporate differing state standards. The only federal laws that 
would potentially be unconstitutional under the uniformity princi-
ple would be those statutes that—like the Sports Protection Act—
regulate along state lines and treat the same object differently in 
different states. Part VI will examine some representative federal 
statutes of this nature and will explore the circumstances in which 
they might survive, or fail, constitutional scrutiny. To be sure, Part 
VI will raise more questions than it answers. The exact contours of 
the constitutional uniformity principle have never been clearly es-
tablished, even after two centuries of jurisprudence under the Uni-
formity and Bankruptcy Clauses, and it is not my purpose here to 
attempt to delineate them or to explain exactly how they would 
operate to constrain the commerce power. The goal of Part VI is 
substantially more modest: to flag the issues that the courts will 
need to decide and the factors that they will need to consider if 
they choose to revitalize the uniformity constraint on the com-
merce power. In particular, one question that the courts will be 
forced to confront is whether it violates the uniformity principle for 
Congress to grandfather in existing state laws from the scope of 
new federal regulations, as was done with the Sports Protection 
Act. Part VI will offer some preliminary thoughts on this difficult 
and important question. 
I. THE MODERN RULE: NO UNIFORMITY CONSTRAINT 
Not surprisingly, the Sports Protection Act discussed above was 
opposed by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Na-
tional Association of State Budget Officers, the North American 
Association of State and Provincial Lotteries, and the Council of 
State Governments, none of which wanted to see the regulatory 
authority and revenue-generating capacity of their members cur-
tailed—and many of which were particularly troubled by the bill’s 
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unequal treatment of the states.19 But those who opposed the law 
did not assert the existence of any sort of categorical constitutional 
bar to nonuniformity in the exercise of the commerce power. 
Rather, they couched their objections to the nonuniform applica-
tion of the bill in equal protection terms, conceding that it “is true 
that the courts require a showing of only a rational basis”20 to up-
hold a federal statute enacted pursuant to the commerce power 
that discriminates between the states, but claiming that there was 
no such basis for the differing treatment of the states by the Sports 
Protection Act.21
This was not much of an objection. As every law student learns, 
rational basis review is, in the Supreme Court’s words, “the most 
relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny”22—“a paradigm of 
judicial restraint.”23 So long as there are “‘plausible reasons’ for 
Congress’s action, ‘[the judicial] inquiry is at an end.’”24 Congress 
surely had plausible reasons for grandfathering in existing state 
laws. It recognized that the asserted evils of sports gambling—the 
threat to the integrity and image of amateur and professional 
19 See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S. 473 and S. 474 
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 99–190, 231–35 (1991); Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial 
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 58–72, 88–100 (1991); S. Rep. 
No. 102-248, at 7, 13 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3558, 3563. 
20 138 Cong. Rec. 12,975 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
21 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 13 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563 
(minority views of Sen. Grassley) (“There is simply no rational basis, as a matter of 
Federal policy, for allowing sports wagering in three States, while prohibiting it in the 
other 47, nor any rational basis . . . for the purported discrimination between Nevada, 
Oregon, and Delaware.”); 138 Cong. Rec. 12,975 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley) 
(“[T]here is no rational basis for letting some well-connected States with sports gam-
bling get away with what the other 46 cannot.”); see also Rose, supra note 3, at 242 
(“The statute is of questionable constitutionality, because there is no rational reason 
for . . . which states get special treatment and benefits.”). Senator Grassley proposed 
an amendment that would have afforded all of the other states an opportunity, similar 
to the one given to New Jersey, see supra note 13, to exempt themselves from the 
federal law. See 138 Cong. Rec. 12,974 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley). That 
amendment failed. See id. at 12,979 (1992) (statement of Sen. Kerry, Presiding Offi-
cer). 
22 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). 
23 FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 
24 Id. at 313–14 (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). 
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sports and the encouragement of youth gambling25—would seem to 
call for a full nationwide ban, but it had “no wish to apply this new 
prohibition retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which instituted 
sports lotteries prior to the introduction of [the federal] legisla-
tion,”26 or to Montana, which had already legalized certain forms of 
sports gambling at bingo parlors.27 Nor did Congress have “any de-
sire to threaten the economy of Nevada, which over many decades 
has come to depend on legalized private gambling, including sports 
gambling, as an essential industry.”28 This differential treatment 
may not have reached the height of fairness, but it was by no 
means entirely irrational.29 For that reason, even the leader of the 
bill’s opposition could only bring himself to assert on the Senate 
floor that the law was “arguably unconstitutional.”30
That the Sports Protection Act’s opponents made no effort to 
argue that the nonuniform regulation of commerce, even if ra-
tional, is beyond the power of Congress is not particularly surpris-
ing. The Supreme Court has repeatedly scorned that very asser-
tion. While the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from 
discriminating against interstate commerce,31 that doctrine is not 
25 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555. 
26 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559. 
27 138 Cong. Rec. 12,973 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
28 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559; 
see also 138 Cong. Rec. 12,978 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (“So instead of 
trying to have the Government run roughshod over a State that has built its economy 
around that, we exempted them. It seems to me that this is what good legislation is all 
about, being understanding of the economic gains in each State.”). The exemption for 
New Jersey is surely a more difficult call, since New Jersey did not authorize, and had 
never authorized, sports betting. Still, Atlantic City was a major casino center, rivaled 
only by Las Vegas, and it was probably rational for Congress to decide that, because 
New Jersey had long ago created a gambling city upon which it had built a substantial 
part of its economy, it should have been given the right to decide for itself which 
forms of betting would be legal there and whether it wanted to compete in the sports 
betting arena with Las Vegas. 
29 Cf. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (employing rational basis 
scrutiny to uphold a grandfather provision of local ordinance under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). Indeed, the Supreme Court has long maintained that “[i]t is no require-
ment of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.” 
Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). 
30 138 Cong. Rec. 12,975 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
31 See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996); infra note 158. 
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applicable to the federal government.32 To the contrary, the federal 
government is, according to the Court, perfectly free to regulate 
the states unevenly pursuant to the commerce power. The Su-
preme Court has found “no warrant” for the “contention that mere 
lack of uniformity in the exercise of the commerce power renders 
the action of Congress invalid.”33 According to the Court, “[i]t is of 
the essence of the plenary power conferred that Congress may ex-
ercise its discretion in the use of the power,” and may “choose 
the . . . places to which its regulation shall apply.”34 Thus, the Court 
has declared time and again over the course of the last century 
(though it has never squarely held35) that “[t]here is no require-
ment of uniformity in connection with the commerce power.”36
Because the Court has disavowed the existence of a uniformity 
requirement, it has declared that a nonuniform exercise of the 
commerce power should be subjected only to the permissive con-
straints of the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause.37 If such a law does not employ suspect classifications or in-
fringe on fundamental rights, it will be upheld as long as the dis-
tinctions that it draws between states are not entirely irrational.38
It was this line of cases that gave the supporters of the Sports 
Protection Act confidence that the law was constitutional, notwith-
standing its discriminatory scope. Senator Bradley defended the 
32 In fact, the Court has long held that Congress can authorize the states to discrimi-
nate in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985). 
33 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939). 
34 Id. 
35 See infra note 267. 
36 Currin, 306 U.S. at 14; see also, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 
U.S. 457, 468 (1982) (“Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not re-
quired by the Commerce Clause.”); Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 
604, 616 (1950) (“Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic 
uniformity.”); James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917) 
(“[I]t is obvious that the argument seeks to engraft upon the Constitution a restriction 
not found in it, that is, that the power to regulate conferred upon Congress obtains 
subject to the requirement that regulations enacted shall be uniform throughout the 
United States.”). 
37 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–33 (1981). See generally Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause contains a guarantee of equal protection of the laws). 
38 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331–32. 
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constitutionality of the bill in the legal press by insisting that, be-
cause the “Supreme Court has explicitly held that there is no re-
quirement of uniformity when Congress is exercising its power 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause,” there was “no legitimate con-
stitutional basis” for objecting to the bill on the ground that it dis-
criminates among the states.39 And it was this line of cases that 
forced the bill’s opponents to resort to unconvincing and half-
hearted pleas of irrationality. 
The Court’s language in these cases is plain enough. But is there 
really “no legitimate constitutional basis” at all for suggesting that 
Congress cannot enact regulations of commerce that explicitly dis-
criminate between the states? I hope to establish below that, at the 
very least, this was an overstatement on Senator Bradley’s part. 
Indeed, if we even so much as dab a toe beneath the surface of the 
calm seas of settled precedent, we immediately feel the tug of a 
powerful undertow. 
The Court’s failure to find a uniformity requirement in the exer-
cise of the commerce power is based on a simple comparison of 
constitutional texts. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes.”40 As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained long ago, that power is “complete in itself, may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution.”41 The Commerce Clause 
contains no express uniformity requirement, in marked contrast 
with the Uniformity Clause—which empowers Congress to impose 
taxes, but directs that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States”42—and the Naturalization and 
Bankruptcy Clauses, which allow Congress “[t]o establish [a] uni-
form Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”43 Noting the lack of a 
comparable expression of a uniformity requirement in the Com-
39 Bradley, supra note 8, at 17–18. 
40 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
41 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
42 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
43 Id. § 8, cl. 4. 
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merce Clause, the Court has concluded that no such requirement 
exists.44
The only express limitation on the commerce power in the Con-
stitution is the largely forgotten Port Preference Clause, which 
provides that “[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of an-
other.”45 But this clause imposes, on its face, a very narrow restric-
tion, applying only to commercial regulations directly targeting or 
affecting ports. Thus, the Court has considered the Port Preference 
Clause only rarely, usually in cases involving acts that operated to 
steer shipping traffic from one port to another, such as a law plac-
ing an obstruction in one fork of a river, thus diverting the water to 
the other fork (in another state),46 or a law approving a low-
clearance bridge that precluded boats with high masts from sailing 
up the river into another state.47
The Court’s reasoning in refusing to countenance a general uni-
formity constraint on the commerce power has the appeal of sim-
plicity. The Constitution contains a provision precluding discrimi-
nation in the regulation of commerce, but that provision on its face 
applies only to a narrow set of laws regulating ports. The Framers 
knew how to express a more general requirement of uniform legis-
lation; they did so with regard to some congressional powers, like 
the bankruptcy and tax powers, but did not do so for the commerce 
power. When a text contains a restriction in some sections, but not 
others, ordinary principles of statutory interpretation counsel 
against reading the restriction into the other sections.48
44 See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982); Sec’y of 
Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 
373, 388–89 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 
(1939). 
45 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
46 See South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 8–13 (1876). 
47 See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433–
46 (1855). More recently, lower courts have applied the Port Preference Clause to 
acts involving regulation of airports. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 
439–41 (D.C. Cir. 1994); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1196–98 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
48 See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144–46 (1995); Fedorenko v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (“That Congress was perfectly capable of 
adopting a ‘voluntariness’ limitation where it felt that one was necessary is plain from 
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But affording dispositive weight to base textualism of this sort in 
constitutional interpretation must surely prompt John Marshall to 
flail in his grave. To employ such reasoning is, after all, to “forget[] 
that it is a constitution we are expounding,” not a “legal code.”49 
The Constitution is not the Employment Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (“ERISA”), and a constitutional analysis that begins and 
ends with the text, and does nothing more than compare the dispa-
rate wording of different clauses, is, in most circumstances, woe-
fully incomplete. 
And so it is here. In fact, the Court’s modern rule is, I submit, di-
rectly contrary both to the original intent of the Framers and to the 
once-settled general understanding of the scope of the commerce 
power. It would probably come as a surprise to Senator Bradley, 
and to many members of the current Supreme Court, that Justice 
Story once declared quite matter-of-factly that the Constitution 
“prevent[s] any possibility of applying the power to . . . regulate 
commerce[] injuriously to the interests of any one state, so as to fa-
vour or aid another.”50 And the Justices might be even more 
shocked to learn that the Court itself once decreed that, because 
“the want of uniformity in commercial regulations[] was one of the 
comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those individuals who ‘voluntarily 
assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations . . . .’ Under traditional principles of 
statutory construction, the deliberate omission of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) 
compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution 
of civilians ineligible for visas.” (quoting Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, annex I, pt. 2, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 3037, 3052, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 
20)).  
49 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). It is of course true 
that Marshall himself, in McCulloch itself, drew a comparison between the disparate 
wording of constitutional clauses. See id. at 414–15 (“It is, we think, impossible to 
compare the sentence which prohibits a State from laying ‘imposts, or duties on im-
ports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection 
laws,’ with that which authorizes Congress ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution’ the powers of the general government, with-
out feeling a conviction that the [C]onvention understood itself to change materially 
the meaning of the word ‘necessary,’ by prefixing the word ‘absolutely.’” (quoting 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; § 8, cl. 18)). But that comparison was merely a single 
thread in a rich and detailed tapestry of textual, contextual, historical, and conceptual 
arguments. See id. at 401–25; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. 
L. Rev. 747, 750–58 (1999). It was in no way a dispositive argument unto itself. 
50 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1011 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833). 
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grievances of the citizens under the Confederation[] and the new 
Constitution was adopted, among other things, to remedy th[at] 
defect[] in the prior system,” the Constitution provides that “Con-
gress . . . is forbidden to make any discrimination in enacting com-
mercial or revenue regulations.”51
Clearly, there is more to the picture here than meets the eye 
upon a casual review of the text of Article I. Yet that casual review 
is all that the Supreme Court has undertaken in recounting its cur-
rent position. An adequate explanation necessitates a significantly 
more thorough inquiry, starting with a careful examination of the 
historical record. 
II. THE NATURE OF UNIFORMITY 
But first, before asking whether the Framers intended to impose 
a uniformity constraint on the commerce power, it is useful to in-
quire as to why they might have chosen to do so, and what effect 
they might have intended such a constraint to have. That is to say, 
why did the Framers seek to provide that certain federal regula-
tions (such as those governing bankruptcy, direct taxes, naturaliza-
tion, and, as we shall see, commerce) must be uniform throughout 
the United States? And what, exactly, does it mean to require 
“uniformity” among the states? 
Although the term “uniform throughout the United States” 
could potentially encompass any number of concepts, at the most 
fundamental level, it suggests two distinct ideas, which I will label, 
for lack of a better taxonomy, “uniform rules” and “uniform 
treatment.” Each of these ideas reflects a different rationale for the 
uniformity requirement. 
I use the phrase “uniform rules” to signify a single set of regula-
tions that are generally applicable nationwide, in service of the 
goal of economic efficiency. For most of us, this is the concept that 
first comes to mind when we think about uniform laws. This is the 
type of uniformity sought by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, whose many uniform acts, includ-
ing, most notably, the Uniform Commercial Code, are intended to 
51 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870). 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
264 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:249 
 
 
promote a single efficient national market and legal system.52 Such 
uniform rules are  
desirable and most urgently and immediately needed in matters 
affecting directly the business common to and coextensive with 
the whole country, [because] variant and conflicting laws pro-
duce in all the states the special evils or inconveniences of per-
plexity, uncertainty, and confusion, with consequent waste, a 
tendency to hinder freedom of trade and to occasion unnecessary 
insecurity of contracts, resulting in needless litigation and miscar-
riage of justice.53  
In calling for “uniform” regulations, the Framers clearly had in 
mind uniform rules of this type, and for just this reason.54
But this notion of “uniform rules” is not the only notion of uni-
formity that pervaded the Constitutional Convention. The Framers 
also demanded “uniform treatment”—a term that I use to convey 
an anti-discrimination, as opposed to a utilitarian, concept. The 
motivation for uniform treatment is not the efficiency that stems 
from establishing a single set of rules to govern all transactions 
throughout the nation, but rather the fairness that results from en-
suring that the states (and their people) are all treated equally by 
the federal government.55 On an individual (as opposed to a state) 
52 See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 13 (1991). 
53 Id. at 20. 
54 See infra Part III. 
55 It may be worth noting that the line that I am drawing here between “uniform 
rules” and “uniform treatment” does not correspond to the principal lines that have 
been drawn in employment discrimination and equal protection law. The fundamen-
tal division in those areas has been between the notions of “disparate treatment” and 
“disparate impact.” Both disparate treatment and disparate impact are concerned 
with nondiscrimination; disparate treatment involves express discrimination, whereas 
disparate impact involves the discrimination that results from the unequal effect of 
facially neutral policies. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 335 n.15 (1977). Thus, both disparate treatment and disparate impact can be said 
to fall within the concept of “uniform treatment.” (Although, I hasten to add, “dispa-
rate impact” cases would not be cognizable under the uniformity constraint on the 
commerce power. See infra Section VI.A.) “Uniform rules,” by contrast, is not an 
equality concept at all; it is an efficiency concept. 
 Along the same lines, there has been much discussion of a potential distinction in 
equal protection law between “equality of opportunity” and “equality of result.” See, 
e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurispruden-
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level, this notion of uniformity as a means of ensuring equal treat-
ment is the impetus behind institutions like the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines56 and, indeed, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court.57
It is important to distinguish between these two concepts when 
contemplating questions of uniformity among the states. Because a 
call for uniform rules is a more stringent demand than a call for 
uniform treatment, some laws can be “uniform” in the latter sense, 
but not the former. For instance, a federal law allowing each state 
to decide for itself whether it wishes to legalize sports gambling is 
uniform in the sense of uniform treatment, but not in the sense of 
uniform rules. Such a law affords each state the same opportunity 
to act (thus uniform treatment), but the ultimate rules are likely to 
vary across state lines—sports betting will probably be legal in 
tial Appraisal, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1687, 1698 (1986); David A. Strauss, The Illusory Dis-
tinction Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result, 34 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 171, 171–72 (1992). That distinction also differs from the one drawn here, and 
for the same reason. Both “equality of opportunity” and “equality of result” are con-
cerned with treating people the same—with genuine notions of nondiscrimination and 
equality. The question is simply whether equality should be determined by the oppor-
tunities seemingly afforded ex ante by the policy in question or by the ultimate impact 
of that policy on the well-being of the people. Neither of those concepts corresponds 
to “uniform rules,” which seeks efficiency rather than equality. 
56 See, e.g., Jason Bent, Note, Sentencing Equality for Deportable Aliens: Depar-
tures from the Sentencing Guidelines on the Basis of Alienage, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1320, 
1345 (2000) (noting that “the idea of equal treatment for similarly situated defendants 
was central to the creation of a uniform system of sentencing guidelines”). 
57 As future-Justice Iredell remarked at the North Carolina Ratification Conven-
tion: 
The propriety of having a Supreme Court in every government must be obvious 
to every man of reflection. There can be no other way of securing the admini-
stration of justice uniformly in the several states. There might be, otherwise, as 
many different adjudications on the same subject as there are states. It is to be 
hoped that, if this government be established, connections still more intimate 
than the present will subsist between the different states. The same measure of 
justice, therefore, as to the objects of their common concern, ought to prevail in 
all. A man in North Carolina, for instance, if he owed £100 here, and was com-
pellable to pay it in good money, ought to have the means of recovering the 
same sum, if due to him in Rhode Island, and not merely the nominal sum, at 
about an eighth or tenth part of its intrinsic value. To obviate such a grievance 
as this, the Constitution has provided a tribunal to administer equal justice to 
all. 
4 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 147 (Ayer Co. 1987) (Jona-
than Elliot ed., 1888) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates]. 
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some states, and not in others—as some states will choose to legal-
ize gambling and others will not (thus nonuniform rules). Nation-
wide efficiency may be sacrificed, but nondiscrimination will be 
preserved.  
III. THE HISTORICAL UNIFORMITY MANDATE 
An examination of the historical record reveals that, notwith-
standing what was essentially an inadvertent failure to include an 
explicit uniformity mandate in the text of the Commerce Clause, 
the Framers of the Federal Constitution were deeply concerned 
with both “uniform rules” and “uniform treatment” in all commer-
cial matters. 
A. The Articles of Confederation 
The lack of a provision in the Articles of Confederation empow-
ering Congress to regulate commerce was one of the primary cata-
lysts for the Constitutional Convention.58 Because the commerce 
power resided in the several states, rather than in the central gov-
ernment, foreign nations—most notably Great Britain—dealt with 
the states as a set of individual, rival trading nations, imposing em-
bargoes and restrictions on American shipping and successfully pit-
ting the states against one another.59 Lacking regulatory authority 
over commerce, Congress was powerless to strike back with a uni-
fied trade policy. Some individual states sought to respond with 
their own trade restrictions, but that simply afforded the other 
states a competitive advantage. For example, in 1785, three New 
England states, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, 
“passed laws restricting British trade in their ports, hoping to force 
concessions from the British in the West Indies. But Connecticut, 
seeing a chance to draw the British trade to itself, refused to join 
58 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445–46 (1827) (“It may be 
doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the federal gov-
ernment, contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present sys-
tem, than the deep and general conviction, that commerce ought to be regulated by 
Congress.”); The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
59  See David Hutchison, The Foundations of the Constitution 102 (1975). 
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the others, and the scheme foundered.”60 In the absence of federal 
authority, it was simply impossible to get all thirteen states to re-
taliate in unison against foreign restrictions.61
To make matters worse, the states also taxed and discriminated 
against goods shipped in interstate commerce: 
Some states taxed the goods of other states and greatly irritated 
their neighbors. Connecticut taxed the imports of Massachusetts. 
Rhode Island taxed her neighbors. New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland passed navigation laws which 
treated the citizens of the other states of the Union as aliens. The 
laws of Maryland, in violation of the Articles of Confederation, 
granted exclusive privileges to her own vessels, yet all Congress 
could do was to recommend to the contrary. Virginia did the 
same thing. New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Caro-
lina “taxed and irritated the adjoining States trading through 
them.”62
Here again, Congress was impotent, and American commerce suf-
fered greatly as a result. 
Consequently, pleas were repeatedly made in Congress for the 
states to empower the federal government to regulate commerce. 
For instance, a committee consisting of, among others, Elbridge 
Gerry and Thomas Jefferson, reported in 1784 on the “delicate 
situation of commerce at this time,” declaring that 
60  Christopher Collier & James Lincoln Collier, Decision in Philadelphia 6 (1986). 
Madison lamented this development in a letter to Jefferson: 
The States are every day giving proofs that separate regulations are more likely 
to set them by the ears than to attain the common object. When Massachusetts 
set on foot a retaliation of the policy of Great Britain, Connecticut declared her 
ports free. New Jersey served New York in the same way. And Delaware I am 
told has lately followed the example in opposition to the commercial plans of 
Pennsylvania. 
Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 16 (2d ed. 1937) (quoting a letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786)). 
61  See Hutchison, supra note 59, at 102–03. 
62  Id. at 103 (quoting the recollections of Madison in 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 
57, at 119 (footnotes omitted)); see also Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the 
Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 
448–49 (1941). 
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few objects of greater importance can present themselves to their 
notice. The fortune of every Citizen is interested in the fate of 
commerce: for it is the constant source of industry and wealth; 
and the value of our produce and our land must ever rise or fall 
in proportion to the prosperous or adverse state of trade.63
The committee explained that, “[a]lready has Great-Britain at-
tempted a monopoly which is destructive of our trade with her 
West-India Islands,” and there was “too much reason to apprehend 
other nations might follow the example, and the commerce of 
America become the victim of illiberal policy.”64 The committee 
thus cautioned that, 
unless the United States can act as a nation and be regarded as 
such by foreign powers, and unless Congress for this purpose 
shall be vested with powers competent to the protection of com-
merce, they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade; 
and without such reciprocity, our foreign commerce must decline 
and eventually be annihilated.65
The following year, Congress explained the problem in much 
greater detail in a letter to the state legislatures imploring them to 
authorize a federal power to regulate commerce: 
If . . . the Commercial regulations, of any foreign power, 
contravene the interests of any particular State . . . , what 
course[] will it take to remedy the evil? If it makes similar 
regulations to counteract those of that power by reciprocat-
ing the disadvantages which it feels, by imposts or otherwise, 
will it produce the desired effect? What operation will it have 
upon the neighbouring States? Will they enter into similar 
regulations, and make it a common Cause? On the contrary 
will they not in pursuit of the same local policy avail them-
selves of this circumstance, to turn it to their particular ad-
vantage? Thus then we behold the several States taking sepa-
63  Circular Letter of the Committee to Whom Was Referred Sundry Letters and 
Papers Relative to Commercial Matters (April 22, 1784), in 26 Journals of the Conti-
nental Congress 1774–1789, at 262, 269 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928).  
64  Id. at 270. 
65  Id. 
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rate measures in pursuit of their particular interests, in oppo-
sition to the regulations of foreign powers, and separately aiding 
those powers to defeat the regulations of each other; for unless 
the States act together there is no plan of policy into which they 
can seperately [sic] enter which they will not be seperately [sic] 
interested to defeat, and of Course all their measures, must prove 
vain and abortive.66
To say that the problem required a national solution—as virtu-
ally everyone did—was to say that it required a uniform solution. 
As the foregoing indicates, the problems facing commerce 
stemmed from the inability to craft a single, uniform rule. The 
trading laws of some states “were defeated by diversion of foreign 
shipments to others which, by chance or by design, undercut the 
tariffs of the former; and, until a uniform control of the subject was 
placed in federal hands, other nations could circumvent with impu-
nity the commercial regulations of the several states.”67
Thus, the calls for congressional power over commerce empha-
sized the need not just for national regulation, but for uniform na-
tional regulation. For instance, a 1786 committee report declared 
that “[f]or want of due regulation the foreign commerce of the 
[U]nion is threatened with annihilation,” and concluded: 
Convinced of the great utility of a well regulated commercial 
system and the impracticability of forming one, uniform and effi-
cacious under thirteen different authorities, we think it the duty 
of Congress to call the attention of the States to a subject of such 
magnitude, the longer neglect of which must be attended with 
evils of vast importance.68
66 Letter to State Legislatures from the Committee to Whom was Referred the Mo-
tion of James Monroe (March 28, 1785), in 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 
1774–1789, at 199, 203 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).  
67 Abel, supra note 62, at 448; see also, Hutchison, supra note 59, at 103 (noting that 
one defect in the Articles of Confederation giving rise to the Constitutional Conven-
tion “was the lack of uniformity in the commercial regulations of the United States”). 
68  Committee Report to Whom Were Recommitted Sundry Papers and Documents 
Relative to Commerce (Feb. 28, 1786), in 30 Journals of the Continental Congress 
1774–1789, at 85, 88 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934); see also, e.g., 1 George Bancroft, 
History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America 250 
(New York, D. Appleton and Co. 1882) (noting that commissioners from Virginia and 
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The inability to create uniform rules was the problem—the very 
reason why the new nation needed a federal commerce power. But 
the want of uniformity was more than just the precipitating factor 
in the call for greater national power; it was also a necessary limita-
tion on the existence of any such power. For the Framers were 
deeply concerned not only with “uniform rules,” but also with 
“uniform treatment.” That is to say, they demanded uniformity not 
only in the name of efficiency, but also in the name of nondiscrimi-
nation. Many states—specifically the Southern states and the small 
states, both of which saw themselves as outnumbered—feared that 
a national commerce power would end up serving as a vehicle by 
which a majority of states would advance their own interests at the 
expense of the minority.69 For instance, Richard Henry Lee wrote 
to Madison in 1785: 
It seems to me clear beyond doubt that the giving Congress a 
power to legislate over the trade of the Union would be danger-
ous in the extreme to the five Southern or staple States, whose 
want of ships and seamen would expose their freightage and 
their produce to a most pernicious and destructive monopoly. 
With such a power eight States in the Union would be stimulated 
by extreme interest to shut close the door of monopoly, that by 
the exclusion of all rivals, whether for the purchasing of our pro-
duce or freighting it, both these might be at the mercy of our 
East and North. The spirit of commerce throughout the world is 
a spirit of avarice, and could not fail to act as above stated.70
As much to allay this fear of discrimination as to ensure the utili-
tarian benefits of nationwide standards, many of the proposals for 
an early commerce power contained explicit uniformity limitations. 
Representative Witherspoon, for example, proposed in 1781 that 
“the United States in Congress assembled should be vested 
with . . . the exclusive right of laying duties upon all imported arti-
cles,” provided, however, that “the same articles shall bear the 
Maryland who met in 1785 at the request of George Washington to draft a compact 
for jurisdiction over the Chesapeake Bay and other shared waters also “recom-
mended to the two states . . . a uniformity of commercial regulations”). 
69  See, e.g., Warren, supra note 60, at 567–90. 
70  Id. at 580–81.  
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same duty and impost throughout the said states without exemp-
tion.”71
Thus, as the Supreme Court once noted, throughout the pre-
Convention debates, 
the claim that it was essential to confer upon Congress the au-
thority to lay duties, imposts and excises to be uniform through-
out the United States, became associated in the discussion with 
the asserted necessity that Congress should have the power to es-
tablish uniform regulations of commerce to prevent the discrimi-
nation resulting from the laying of duties, imposts and excises by 
the respective States.72
Far and away the most important of these early propositions was 
James Madison’s proposal in the Virginia House of Delegates that 
Virginia should take the lead in asking the states to vest Congress 
with the power to regulate commerce. The preamble to that pro-
posal stated: 
Whereas the relative situation of the United States has been 
found, on trial, to require uniformity in their commercial regula-
tions, as the only effectual policy for obtaining, in the ports of 
foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to those en-
joyed by the subjects of such nations in the ports of the United 
States; for preventing animosities which cannot fail to arise 
among the several states from the interference of partial and 
separate regulations; and whereas such uniformity can be best 
concerted and carried into effect by the federal councils, which, 
having been instituted for the purpose of managing the interests 
of the states in cases which cannot so well be provided for by 
measures individually pursued, ought to be invested with author-
ity in this case, as being within the reason and policy of their in-
stitution.73
To that end, Madison proposed that Congress “be authorized to 
prohibit vessels belonging to any foreign nation from entering any 
of the ports [of the states], or to impose any duties on such vessels 
71  1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 92. 
72  Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 100 (1900). 
73  1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 114 (emphasis added). 
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and their cargoes which may be judged necessary; all such prohibi-
tions and duties to be uniform throughout the United States.”74
This proposal played a central role in the formation of the Fed-
eral Constitution. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]hough the 
resolution of Mr. Madison was not adopted, it led to the sending by 
Virginia of commissioners to Annapolis to meet commissioners 
from the other States, the result of which meeting was the Federal 
[C]onvention of 1787.”75 Those commissioners were tasked “to 
consider how far a uniform system in [the states’] commercial regu-
lations may be necessary to their common interest and their per-
manent harmony; and to report to the several states such an 
act, . . . as . . . will enable [Congress] effectually to provide for the 
same.”76 In Daniel Webster’s words, “[t]he entire purpose for 
which the delegates assembled at Annapolis, was to devise means 
for the uniform regulation of trade.”77
Attendance in Annapolis was sparse, and the commissioners 
therefore voted to ask the states to send commissioners to a new 
meeting to be held in Philadelphia in May of 1787, at which the 
delegates would discuss the need for a uniform federal commerce 
power along with other problems plaguing the young nation.78 That 
new meeting was, of course, the Constitutional Convention. 
Thus, the men who called the Constitutional Convention pas-
sionately sought uniformity in all commercial regulations, and they 
did so for two distinct reasons. First, they believed that “uniform 
rules” were necessary to save the fledgling Republic; efficiency 
demanded that Congress be empowered to establish a single set of 
rules to govern nationwide. And second, they believed that “uni-
form treatment” was essential to prohibit unjust discrimination; the 
74  Id. (emphasis added). 
75  Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101. 
76  5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 113 (emphasis added); see also 1 id. at 117 
(recounting that all of the commissioners from the several states that met in Annapo-
lis in 1786 had nearly identical marching orders). 
77  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1824) (summarizing the arguments 
of counsel); see also Nelson Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1193, 1217 (1984) ([M]uch of the discussion leading up to the Convention was 
concerned with ensuring that the related measures of taxation and commercial regula-
tion would be made uniform.”). 
78  See 1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 117–18. 
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powerful states that would dominate the Congress could not be 
permitted to use their newly granted commercial power mali-
ciously to oppress the weaker states. 
B. The Constitutional Convention 
As such, when the Framers arrived in Philadelphia in the sum-
mer of 1787 to hammer out a new blueprint for government, they 
maintained as perhaps their single most pressing goal the need to 
effectuate the Madisonian proposal by vesting Congress with the 
power to enact regulations and duties governing interstate com-
merce, so long as those regulations and duties were uniform 
throughout the United States. In this endeavor, the Framers surely 
thought that they succeeded. The entire substance of Madison’s 
proposal ultimately made it into the Constitution. But, due essen-
tially to stylistic tinkering, the mandate ended up being disbursed 
in three separate clauses: the Commerce Clause, the Uniformity 
Clause, and the Port Preference Clause. 
1. The Commerce and Tax Power 
Each of the original proposals for enumerated congressional 
powers—Charles Pinckney’s alternative to the Virginia Plan,79 and 
William Patterson’s New Jersey Plan—contained a clause granting 
Congress the power to collect commercial taxes and to regulate 
commerce.80 Although today we tend to think of these powers as 
79  Rather than enumerating individual federal powers, the Virginia Plan submitted 
by Edmund Randolph (though largely the work of Madison) afforded Congress the 
broad power “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or 
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of indi-
vidual Legislation.” 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand]. This power surely encompassed authority 
over commerce, as Randolph himself made clear. See 1 id. at 19 (listing the lack of a 
commerce power as a fundamental defect of the Articles of Confederation); Grant S. 
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First 
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve Statute Control 
Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 31 n.121 (1999). Pinckney submitted his plan on 
the same day as the Virginia Plan. See 1 Farrand, supra, at 20–23. 
80  See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 130 (Pinckney Plan) (“The legislature of 
the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and 
excises; To regulate commerce with all nations, and among the several states.”); 1 
Farrand, supra note 79, at 243 (recounting the New Jersey Plan, which would author-
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entirely distinct—as they are now set forth in separate constitu-
tional clauses—the Framers viewed them largely as one and the 
same.81 They repeatedly spoke of the power over “regulation of ex-
cises & of trade,”82 or the “Power of . . . levying Money & regulat-
ing Commerce,”83 as though this were a single prerogative.84 To the 
Framers, the power to regulate commerce necessarily implied and 
included a power to impose duties.85
Thus, for instance, in a discussion that anticipated future dis-
putes about the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause, Madi-
son declared that “[w]hether the States are now restrained from 
laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power ‘to regu-
late commerce,’” and John Langdon “insisted that the regulation 
ize Congress “to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all 
goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of 
the U. States . . . to pass Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as well with for-
eign nations as with each other”). The Committee of Detail essentially adopted the 
phrasing of the Pinckney Plan, changing only one word. See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra 
note 57, at 130, 378 (changing “regulate commerce with all nations” to “regulate 
commerce with foreign nations”). 
81  Much of the voluminous evidence in support of this proposition is collected in 
Abel, supra note 62, at 446–51. 
82  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 344. 
83  2 id. at 583 (detailing a letter from the Convention to Congress proposing the 
Constitution). 
84  See also The Federalist No. 40, at 32 (James Madison) (Legal Classics Library 
1983) (“[W]as it not an acknowledged object of the [C]onvention, and the universal 
expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the 
general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general 
revenue?”); 2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 135 (discussing the “exclusive Power of regu-
lating Trade and levying Imposts”); 2 id. at 211 (reproducing the notes of James 
McHenry regarding the “extraordinary power . . . to lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts and excises, and to regulate commerce among the several States”); 3 id. at 116 
(recounting Charles Pinckney’s statement regarding “the complete power of regulat-
ing the trade of the Union, and levying . . . imposts and duties upon the same”). 
85  See, e.g., 3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 520–21 (reproducing Madison’s 1832 letter 
to Professor Davis, which noted that “[i]n expounding the Constitution and deducing 
the intention of its Framers, it should never be forgotten, that the great object of the 
Convention was to provide, by a new Constitution, a remedy for the defects of the ex-
isting one; that among these defects was that of a power to regulate foreign com-
merce; that in all nations this regulating power embraced the protection of domestic 
manufactures by duties and restrictions on imports.”); Abel, supra note 62, at 448 (re-
viewing the contemporary records and concluding that “customs control obviously 
was regarded as the principal ingredient of commercial regulation”); id. at 450 (“The 
office of the commerce clause, by and large, was to afford an effective control over 
imports and exports . . . .”). 
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of tonnage was an essential part of the regulation of trade.”86 And 
in the debate over the Export Clause,87 which forbids the federal 
government from imposing export duties, James Wilson lamented 
that “[t]o deny this power is to take from the Common Govt. half 
the regulation of trade.”88
That the Framers conceived of the power to regulate commerce 
and the power to tax commerce as a single power is not surprising. 
The defect in the Articles of Confederation discussed above was 
that the states could not act together to respond to trade restric-
tions, and any individual retaliatory action served only to advan-
tage the other states. This was true whether the retaliation took the 
form of a non-revenue regulation—such as an embargo on goods 
from a particular nation—or an impost or duty. In Congress’s own 
words, quoted above, a federal commerce power was necessary be-
cause if a single state “makes similar regulations to counteract 
those of th[e] [foreign] power, by reciprocating the disadvantages 
which it feels, by impost or otherwise,” such regulations will not 
“produce the desired effect.”89 The power to retaliate by both taxes 
and regulations had to be vested in Congress. 
This conception of a unified tax and commerce power is perhaps 
most clearly manifested in the blending of the two powers in the 
notes of the Committee of Detail. The Wilson notes, for instance, 
contain an awkwardly phrased clause empowering Congress “to 
pass Acts for the Regulation of Trade and Commerce as well with 
foreign Nations as with each other to lay and collect Taxes.”90 In 
what was likely an effort to improve readability, the Committee of 
86  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 625; see also, e.g., The Federalist No. 44, at 71 (James 
Madison) (Legal Classics Library 1983) (“The restraint on the power of the States 
over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity 
of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils.”); 2 Farrand, supra note 
79, at 441 (recounting Madison’s argument at the Convention that allowing states to 
impose duties “would revive all the mischiefs experienced from the want of a Genl. 
Government over commerce”); 2 id. at 588–89 (recounting Madison’s argument that 
“perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power of the States on this subject 
[duties], was the right in the Genl. Government to regulate trade between State & 
State”). 
87  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
88  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 362. 
89  1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 112 (emphasis added). 
90  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 157 . 
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Style ultimately broke the power to regulate commerce and the 
power to collect duties, excises, and imposts into separate clauses. 
In substance, however, these powers remained two sides of the 
same coin: the complete federal power over commercial matters. 
2. The Uniformity Requirement 
Neither the Pinckney Plan nor the New Jersey Plan made spe-
cific mention of a uniformity limitation on this power. That omis-
sion caused great concern among the Southern states, who worried 
about uniform treatment in addition to uniform rules. The South 
feared that, if “the regulation of trade is to be given to the Genl. 
Government, they [Congress] will be nothing more than overseers 
for the Northern States.”91 Thus, James McHenry of Maryland 
noted a discussion that took place among the delegates of his state: 
We adverted also to the 1st sect of the VII article which en-
abled the legislature to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, and to regulate commerce among the several States. We 
almost shuddered at the fate of the commerce of Maryland should 
we be unable to make any change in this extraordinary power.92
And it was not just the Southerners who were concerned. Al-
though the Northern states dominated in 1787, both in terms of the 
number of states and the number of citizens, conventional wisdom 
held that there would soon be a population explosion in the re-
source-rich but sparsely populated Southern states and Southwest-
ern territories, and that a number of new states in the Southwest—
states whose interests would align closely with the Southern 
states—would soon be admitted to the Union.93 Thus, at the Con-
vention, some Northern delegates “expressed the fear that the 
Southern States would join with the [soon to be admitted] new 
Western States in oppressing the commerce of the Eastern 
States.”94 Gouverneur Morris, for instance, proclaimed a desire “to 
91  1 id. at 567 (reproducing Madison’s notes recounting the remarks of General 
Pinckney). 
92  2 id. at 211. 
93  See generally Collier & Collier, supra note 60, at 135–66. 
94  Warren, supra note 60, at 571; see also Collier & Collier, supra note 60, at 138 
(“In designing a new government, the North had to assume that the South would soon 
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provide some defence for the N[orthern] States” from the “oppres-
sion of commerce” that would result if the South and West were to 
gain the upper hand in Congress.95 It seems that everyone was wor-
ried about the potential for Congress to discriminate against his 
state in its exercise of the commerce power.96
The Southern states, for whom the risk of oppression was more 
immediate, first attempted to ameliorate it by seeking to require a 
two-thirds majority vote for all acts of Congress regulating naviga-
tion and commerce.97 But the proposals along those lines, which 
would likely have severely hampered Congress’s efforts to solve 
the nation’s commercial woes, were defeated—in historian Charles 
Warren’s words, “a decided victory for the Northern States, and a 
severe defeat for the South.”98
So rebuffed, the defeated Southern states remained unwilling to 
allow an unchecked commerce power. As Professor Warren ex-
plains, “[i]t is impossible to understand properly the fight over the 
adoption of the Constitution in the Convention, or over its ratifica-
tion outside, unless this fear of the South at Northern domination 
of its commerce is thoroughly realized.”99
become the dominant section of the country in both numbers and wealth. This as-
sumption later proved incorrect, but in 1787, northerners were nervous about the pos-
sibility of a government dominated by the South.”). 
95  1 Farrand, supra note 79, at 604; see also 2 id. at 2–3 (“Mr. Gerry . . . [feared] . . . 
the dangers apprehended from Western states. He was for admitting them on liberal 
terms, but not for putting ourselves into their hands. They will if they acquire power 
like all men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the 
Western Country.”). 
96  See, e.g., 2 id. at 363 (“Mr. Clymer remarked that every State might reason with 
regard to its particular productions, in the same manner as the Southern States. The 
middle States may apprehend combinations agst. them between the Eastern & South-
ern States as much as the latter can apprehend them between the Eastern & mid-
dle.”). 
97  See 2 id. at 449. 
98  Warren, supra note 60, at 579. The defeat was part of the famed horse trade pur-
suant to which the North agreed to preclude Congress from abolishing the slave trade 
until 1808, in return for the South abandoning the supermajority requirement for 
commercial regulations. See Abel, supra note 62, at 453. 
99  Warren, supra note 60, at 580; see also Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy 
Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uni-
formity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 37–38 (1983) (“The fears and jealousies among the 
states and the apprehensions that the general legislature might discriminate in favor 
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On August 25, in another effort to protect minority interests 
against abuse of the commercial power, the Maryland delegates of-
fered a series of proposals imposing an explicit uniformity con-
straint on the commerce and tax power.100 The first of these pro-
posed amendments was not targeted specifically at the broad 
threat of Northern domination over the South, but rather was con-
cerned with another way in which Congress might use the com-
merce power to favor one state over another. The Maryland dele-
gates 
expressed their apprehensions, and the probable apprehensions 
of their constituents, that, under the power of regulating trade, 
the general legislature might favor the ports of particular states, 
by requiring vessels destined to or from other states to enter and 
clear thereat: as vessels belonging or bound to Baltimore, to en-
ter and clear at Norfolk, &c.101
To the end of precluding legislation of this sort, the Maryland 
delegates proposed that 
[t]he legislature of the United States shall not oblige vessels 
belonging to citizens thereof, or to foreigners, to enter or pay du-
ties or imposts in any other state than in that to which they may 
be bound, or to clear out in any other than the state in which 
their cargoes may be laden on board; nor shall any privilege or 
immunity be granted to any vessel on entering or clearing out, or 
paying duties or imposts in one state in preference to another.102
of one state or region to the economic detriment of another were among the most 
strident themes of the Convention.”). 
100  See 2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 378 (reproducing McHenry’s notes on August 
22, which stated that “Mr. Martin shewed us some restrictory clauses drawn up for the 
VII article respecting commerce—which we agreed to bring forward”). 
101  5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 478–79. As Luther Martin explained, with-
out a nondiscrimination provision 
it would have been in the power of the general government to compel all ships 
sailing into or out of the Chesapeake, to clear and enter at Norfolk or some 
port in Virginia—a regulation which would be extremely injurious to [Mary-
land’s] commerce, but which would, if considered merely as to the interest of 
the Union, perhaps not be thought unreasonable, since it would render the col-
lection of revenue arising from commerce more certain and less expensive. 
1 id. at 375. 
102  5 id. at 479. 
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At the same time, the Maryland delegates introduced another, 
more general proposal also aimed at protecting against the dis-
criminatory regulation of commerce—one providing that “‘[a]ll du-
ties, imposts, and excises, prohibitions or restraints, laid or made 
by the legislature of the United States, shall be uniform and equal 
throughout the United States.’”103 By its plain terms, this resolution 
demanded uniformity not only in taxation (“duties, imposts, and 
excises”), but also in non-revenue commercial regulation (“prohi-
bitions or restraints”104), two now-distinct powers that, as I have 
endeavored to explain, were considered one and the same by the 
Framers. 
James McHenry recorded in his notes that these propositions 
were intended, in combination, “to prevent the U.S. from giving 
prefe[re]nces to one State above another or to the shipping of one 
State above another.”105 As he explained to the Maryland House of 
Delegates, they were introduced to “prevent any Combination of 
States” from oppressing the others.106
103  5 id. (quoting the Maryland delegates). 
104  As is self-evident from its terms, the phrase “prohibitions or restraints” denotes 
non-revenue commercial regulations, rather than taxes. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 
U.S. 649, 684 (1892) (discussing the Act to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Be-
tween the United States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 
565, 565–66 (1798), which suspended trade between the United States and France and 
required all American ships to post a bond to be forfeited if the ship does business 
with France or its citizens, but authorized the President to “discontinue the prohibi-
tions and restraints hereby enacted” in the event that France lifted its trade restric-
tions on the United States). Id. 
105  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 470; see also, e.g., Warren, supra note 60, at 588 (“It 
will be noted that all the limitations, thus adopted, were intended to allay . . . the fear 
lest Congress might discriminate against certain of the States.”). 
106  3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 149. The North Carolina delegates gave the same 
explanation of the intended effect of these provisions: 
We had many things to hope from a National Government and the chief thing 
we had to fear from such a Government was the Risque of unequal or heavy 
Taxation, but we hope you will believe as we do that the Southern States in 
general and North Carolina in particular are well secured on that head by the 
proposed system. . . . It is expected a considerable Share of the National Taxes 
will be collected by Impost, Duties and Excises, but you will find it provided in 
the 8th Section of Article the first that all duties, Impost and excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States. 
3 id. at 83–84 (quoting a letter from North Carolina Delegates to Governor Caswell). 
Although these remarks (and McHenry’s as well) focus in particular on nondiscrimi-
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The Maryland proposals were “considered of such vital impor-
tance that they [were] referred to a Special Committee of one from 
each State, elected by ballot.”107 On August 28, the committee is-
sued a report combining the specific proposition (involving prefer-
ences to particular ports) and the general proposition (involving 
preferences in commercial regulation and taxation) into a single 
proposal, which was approved with minor changes the following 
week:108
[t]hat there be inserted, after the 4th clause of the 7th sect.—nor 
shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give preference to 
the ports of one state over those of another, or oblige vessels 
bound to or from any state to enter, clear, or pay duties, in an-
other; and all tonnage, duties, imposts, and excises, laid by the 
legislature, shall be uniform throughout the United States.109
There is no indication that the words “prohibitions or restraints” 
were omitted from the latter clause for reasons other than style 
and redundancy, the proposal already beginning with the words 
nation in taxes, the Maryland regulations were clearly intended to achieve the same 
equality in all commercial regulations. 
 The provision forbidding federal taxes on exports from any state was also intended 
to protect the commerce of the Southern states. See 2 id. at 305–06, 362–63; 3 id. at 
365–66. Because the Southern economy was heavily agricultural, and was “entirely 
dependant” on the exportation of crops that grew only in the South, such as tobacco, 
rice, and indigo, the Southern states feared that the Congress, dominated by the 
North, would cripple the Southern economy by imposing massive export taxes on 
these crops alone. See Warren, supra note 60, at 572–73. The Southern delegates 
therefore insisted on a categorical ban on all federal export taxes. See id. 
 And finally, this fear of discriminatory commercial regulations can also be seen in 
the debates on June 8 concerning the (ultimately rejected) proposal to grant Congress 
a veto power over state laws. Gunning Bedford of Delaware spoke out against the 
proposition: 
Delaware now stands 1/13th of the whole—when the system of equal represen-
tation [in the House of Representatives] obtains Delaware will be 1/90th—
Virginia & Pensylvania will stand 28/90th—Suppose a rivalry in commerce or 
manufacture between Delaware and these two States; what chance has Dela-
ware agt. them? Bounties may be given in Virgina. & Pensylvania, and their in-
fluence in the Genl. Govt. or Legislature will prevent a negative, not so if the 
same measure is attempted in Delaware. 
1 Farrand, supra note 79, at 172; see also 1 id. at 167. 
107  Warren, supra note 60, at 587. 
108  See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 483–84, 506–07. 
109  5 id. at 483–84. 
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“any regulation of commerce or revenue.”110 Indeed, it appears that 
James McHenry, who had introduced the general proposition de-
manding uniformity in all exercises of the commerce power, was 
satisfied that the Convention had adopted his proposal in full. He 
recorded in his notes from August 31 that “the restrictory proposi-
tions from Maryland were taken up—and carried.”111 There is no 
indication that McHenry, or anyone else, was dissatisfied with the 
change in wording or was concerned in any way that this clause 
might be interpreted to permit discrimination in commercial regu-
lations. 
When the Committee of Style proposed a full draft of the Con-
stitution on September 12, however, it accidentally left the uni-
formity mandate out of the document altogether. That error was 
promptly remedied two days later, at which point the clause was 
broken back up into two parts, again by unanimous vote with no 
indication of a change in meaning.112 As the Supreme Court long 
ago explained: 
On September 14, 178[7], the words “But all such duties, im-
posts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” 
which, in their adoption had been associated with and formed 
but a part of the clause forbidding a preference in favor of the 
port of one State over the port of another State—in other words, 
had been a part of another clause—were shifted, by a unanimous 
vote, from that paragraph, and were annexed to the provisions 
granting the power to tax. 
Thus, it came to pass that although the provisions as to prefer-
ence between ports and that regarding uniformity of duties, im-
posts and excises were one in purpose, one in their adoption, 
they became separated only in arranging the Constitution for the 
110  See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 104 (1900) (“It will be noticed that the 
committee recommended, not merely that preferences between ports should be for-
bidden by ‘any regulation of commerce,’ but also that such preferences should not be 
made by ‘any regulation of revenue.’ This, obviously, rendered it unnecessary to in-
clude, in the latter part of the clause, ‘prohibitions or restraints,’ as proposed by Mr. 
McHenry and General Pinckney. The substantial effect of the first clause of the para-
graph was to require that all regulations of commerce or of revenue affecting com-
merce through the ports of the States should be the same in all ports.”). 
111  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 482. 
112  See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 n.10 (1983). 
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purpose of style. The first now stands in the Constitution as a 
part of the sixth clause of section 7 of article 1, and the other is a 
part of the first clause of section 8 of article 1.113
Thus, the provisions that became the Port Preference Clause and 
the Uniformity Clause were “one in purpose.” And, as the forego-
ing indicates, that purpose was clear. They were intended to be “an 
interrelated limitation on the National Government’s commerce 
power”114—a power that the Framers understood to encompass 
both regulation and taxation. Specifically, they were intended to 
fully implement the substance of Madison’s original proposal for a 
federal commerce power, and to allay the fears of the Southern 
states by mandating that all federal regulations of commerce must 
treat the states uniformly. 
Recall that the proposal drafted by James Madison—the puta-
tive father of our Constitution—that precipitated the Constitu-
tional Convention asked that Congress “be authorized to prohibit 
vessels belonging to any foreign nation from entering any of the 
ports [of the states], or to impose any duties on such vessels and 
their cargoes which may be judged necessary; all such prohibitions 
and duties to be uniform throughout the United States.”115 A cen-
tury ago, the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of that 
seminal text in interpreting the Constitution: 
It will be noticed that the words “uniform throughout the 
United States” are the same which were subsequently adopted in 
the [Uniformity Clause], and that the term uniformity, in the 
resolution of Mr. Madison, was applied not only to duties, but to 
regulations and prohibitions respecting external commerce, which 
were designed to be the same all over the Union.116
113  Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 105–06; see also Warren, supra note 60, at 588; Lund, su-
pra note 77, at 1216. 
114  Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80 n.10; see also id. at 81 (“There was concern that the Na-
tional Government would use its power over commerce to the disadvantage of par-
ticular States. The Uniformity Clause was proposed as one of several measures de-
signed to limit the exercise of that power.”). 
115  1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 114. 
116  Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 100. 
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Accordingly, in the minds of the Framers, the total effect of the 
Uniformity Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Port Preference 
Clause was to effectuate fully Madison’s proposal—to empower 
Congress to enact regulations governing, and to impose duties 
upon, commerce, as long as those regulations and duties were uni-
form throughout the United States. As Charles Pinckney explained 
at the Convention, the Constitution 
invests the United States, with the complete power of regulating 
the trade of the Union, and levying such imposts and duties upon 
the same, for the use of the United States, as shall, in the opinion 
of Congress, be necessary and expedient. So much has been said 
upon the subjects of regulating trade, and levying an impost, and 
the States have so generally adopted them, that I think it unnec-
essary to remark upon this article. The intention, is to invest the 
United States with the power of rendering our maritime regula-
tions uniform and efficient, and to enable them to raise a reve-
nue, for Federal purposes, uncontrolable [sic] by the States.117
At the time, the Framers’ decision to break the Madisonian pro-
posal for a limited federal commerce power into three separate 
clauses was inconsequential; the sum of the three parts was equal 
to the whole. That is to say, the combined effect of the Commerce 
Clause, the Uniformity Clause, and the Port Preference Clause was 
to afford Congress plenary authority to tax and regulate commer-
cial matters, but to require that all such regulations be uniform. 
This was so because the Framers had a narrow conception of the 
scope of the commerce power. Most scholars agree that the Fram-
ers imagined the commerce power to include only the power to tax 
and regulate commercial shipping and navigation between states.118 
Virtually all of this activity was conducted through ports. “In the 
1780s the transportation of goods in the United States was almost 
117  3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 116. 
118  See, e.g., Abel, supra note 62, at 450, 494; Randy E. Barnett, The Original Mean-
ing of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 123, 137, 145–46 (2001); Richard 
A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1395, 
1454 (1987). But see, e.g., 1 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 
in the History of the United States 115–292 (1953) (arguing for a much broader origi-
nal understanding of the scope of the commerce power); Nelson & Pushaw, supra 
note 79, at 107 (same). 
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entirely by water.”119 Given this limited understanding of the 
breadth of the commerce power, the uniformity principle could be 
fully effectuated by guaranteeing uniformity of duties, imposts, and 
excises and by precluding regulations that favored the ports of one 
state over those of another. These were the only ways in which it 
would have occurred to the Framers that the commerce power 
might be exercised nonuniformly to the detriment of particular 
states. Because the Framers did not foresee the explosion of land-
based shipping and the significant expansion of the scope and na-
ture of the commerce power in the late nineteenth and early-to-
mid-twentieth centuries, they would not have imagined any reason, 
after the reworking of the text by the Committee of Style, to sup-
plement the Uniformity Clause and the Port Preference Clause by 
including (redundantly, in their minds) the word “uniform” in the 
Commerce Clause. 
C. Ratification and Beyond 
This intent to bring about uniform, nondiscriminatory commer-
cial regulations was recounted on a number of occasions during the 
ratification debates, from Madison’s statement in the Virginia 
Convention that the “power for the regulation of commerce” will 
finally allow for the needed “uniform regulations,”120 to his declara-
tion in the Federalist Papers that the Constitution will allow “for-
eign trade [to] be properly regulated by uniform laws,”121 to Wil-
liam Dawes’s proclamation in the Massachusetts Convention that 
the Constitution will facilitate much-needed “uniformity in duties, 
imposts, excises, [and] prohibitions.”122 As McHenry explained to 
the Maryland House of Delegates, the Maryland resolutions re-
stricting congressional power over commerce and trade were mani-
festations of the “attention to general Equality that governed the 
deliberations of Convention.”123
This understanding of a uniformity limitation on the commerce 
power that encompassed both “uniform rules” and “uniform 
119  Collier & Collier, supra note 60, at 30. 
120  3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 260. 
121  The Federalist No. 53, at 132 (James Madison) (Legal Classics Library 1983). 
122  2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 58. 
123  3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 149. 
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treatment” persisted in the national consciousness for some time 
after ratification of the Constitution. It found perhaps its most elo-
quent articulation in a February 3, 1792, speech on the floor of the 
House of Representatives by Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, 
himself a former delegate to the Convention: 
In the Constitution of this Government . . . [i]t is also provided, 
that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout 
the United States; and it is provided, that no preference shall be 
given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of 
one State over those of another. The clear and obvious intention 
of the articles mentioned was, that Congress might not have the 
power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their 
power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another. It 
appeared possible, and not very improbable, that the time might 
come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by more 
address, the Representatives of one part of the Union might at-
tempt to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at 
the expense of other people. To prevent the possibility of such a 
combination, the articles that I have mentioned were inserted in 
the Constitution.124
Williamson continued: 
The certain operation of that measure is the oppression of the 
Southern States, by superior numbers in the Northern interest. 
This was to be feared at the formation of this Government, and 
you find many articles in the Constitution, besides those I have 
quoted, which were certainly intended to guard us against the 
dangerous bias of interest, and the power of numbers. . . . I do 
not hazard much in saying, that the present Constitution had 
never been adopted without those preliminary guards in it.125
Charles Pinckney echoed these comments in an 1820 speech on 
the floor of the House of Representatives: 
I will only mention here, as it is perfectly within my recollection, 
that the power was given to Congress to regulate the commerce 
124  3 id. at 365. 
125  3 id. at 365–66. 
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by water between the States, and it being feared, by the South-
ern, that the Eastern would, whenever they could, do so to the 
disadvantage of the Southern States, you will find, in the 6th sec-
tion of the 1st article, Congress are prevented from taxing ex-
ports, or giving preference to the ports of one State over another, 
or obliging vessels bound from one State to clear, enter, or pay 
duties in another.126
And Joseph Story explained in his Commentaries on the Consti-
tution that the purpose of the Uniformity Clause 
was to cut off all undue preferences of one state over another in 
the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. 
Unless duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest 
and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits 
and employments of the people of different states, might exist. 
The agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one state might 
be built up on the ruins of those of another; and a combination of 
a few states in congress might secure a monopoly of certain 
branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if not 
to the destruction, of their less favoured neighbours.127
The Port Preference Clause served a similar end. In Story’s words, 
“[t]he obvious object of these provisions [in combination] is, to 
prevent any possibility of applying the power to lay taxes, or regu-
late commerce, injuriously to the interests of any one state, so as to 
favour or aid another.”128
The Supreme Court fully appreciated all of this throughout the 
nineteenth century, as the Court struggled with questions about the 
scope and exclusivity of the federal commerce power.129 Thus, the 
126  3 id. at 444. Of course, Williamson and Pinckney were Southerners who may 
have had an incentive to rewrite history to support the Southern cause, but their rec-
ollections in these speeches accord with the contemporary records of the Convention. 
127  2 Story, supra note 50, § 954. 
128  2 id. § 1011. 
129  Indeed, notions of uniformity played a central role in the Court’s very first 
landmark Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), in 
which Attorney General William Wirt argued on behalf of the prevailing party that 
the word “uniform” should essentially be read into the Commerce Clause: 
It was an entire, regular, and uniform system, which was to be carried into ef-
fect, and would not admit of the participation and interference of another hand. 
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Passenger Cases of 1849130 reflect a general understanding that 
“[t]he whole spirit of the Constitution is, that the commercial regu-
lations of Congress should be uniform throughout the whole coun-
try.”131 As Justice Wayne put it, the Port Preference Clause “is a 
limitation upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce for 
the purpose of producing entire commercial equality within the 
United States.”132 It “was intended to establish among [the states] a 
perfect equality in commerce and navigation. That all should be 
alike, in respect to commerce and navigation, is an enjoined consti-
tutional equality.”133
Twenty-one years later, the Court repeated that “the want of 
uniformity in commercial regulations, was one of the grievances of 
the citizens under the Confederation; and the new Constitution 
was adopted, among other things, to remedy those defects in the 
prior system.”134 The Court again emphasized not only the utilitar-
ian aspects of uniformity, but also the nondiscrimination aspects: 
“Congress, as well as the States, is forbidden to make any discrimi-
nation in enacting commercial or revenue regulations.”135 The 
Does not regulation, ex vi termini, imply harmony and uniformity of action? If 
this must be admitted to be the natural and proper force of the term, let us sup-
pose that the additional term, uniform, had been introduced into the constitu-
tion, so as to provide that Congress should have power to make uniform regula-
tions of commerce throughout the United States. Then, according to the 
adjudications on the power of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, and 
uniform laws of bankruptcy, throughout the United States, this power would 
unquestionably have been exclusive in Congress. But regulation of that com-
merce which pervades the Union, necessarily implies uniformity, and the same 
result, therefore, follows as if the word had been inserted. 
Id. at 177–78. 
130  The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
131  Id. at 311 (Argument of Mr. Ogden); see also id. at 386 (Argument of Mr. J.P. 
Hall, counsel) (taking as a given that Congress’s regulation of commerce “must be 
uniform throughout the nation”); id. at 405–06 (Opinion of J. McLean). 
132  Id. at 414. 
133  Id. at 420. 
134  Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870). 
135  Id.; see also R.R. Co. v. Richmond, 86 U.S. (18 Wall.) 584, 589 (1873) (“The 
power to regulate commerce among the several States was vested in Congress in or-
der to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse . . . .”); Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 227 (1899) (“[T]he object of vesting in 
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was to insure uniformity of 
regulation . . . .”). 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
288 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:249 
 
 
Commerce Clause, the Port Preference Clause, and the Uniformity 
Clause were “regarded as limitations upon the power of Congress 
to regulate commerce, and as intended to secure entire commercial 
equality.”136
IV. FORGETTING THE PAST 
How did the Court go from declaring in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury that the principle “[t]hat all should be alike, in respect to 
commerce and navigation, is an enjoined constitutional equality,”137 
and therefore “that Congress, as well as the States, is forbidden to 
make any discrimination in enacting commercial or revenue regu-
lations,”138 to categorically insisting in the mid-twentieth century 
that “there is no requirement of uniformity in connection with the 
136  Ward, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 432. This principle is also reflected in Stoutenburgh v. 
Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889). In Stoutenburgh, the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia offered a ringing endorsement, albeit in dicta, of the constitutional man-
date for nondiscrimination in commercial regulation, even when Congress legislates 
in its capacity as the District’s local legislature: 
Such is the declaration by the Supreme Court of the United States, of the spirit 
and scope of these constitutional provisions; that they are necessary to the har-
mony and repose of the States; that they are necessary to the equal justice and 
equal privileges of the citizens of all the States of this Union; that they cannot 
be restricted at all; and that whatever rule is made with reference to them must 
be a uniform rule by the Congress of the United States acting as the National 
Legislature, regulating and controlling the commerce of the entire domain of 
the United States, with a view to do equal justice between all the parts of the 
country and to take away any possibility of prejudice or any suggestion of injus-
tice or discrimination by one as against another. 
Id. at 501–02. 
 Defending this decision in the United States Supreme Court, counsel argued that 
the “whole theory of the Constitution is that all commercial regulations should be 
uniform.” Brief of the Defendant in Error at 11, Stoutenburgh (No. 722). Quoting the 
Uniformity Clause and the Port Preference Clause, counsel argued that the “spirit of 
these restrictions, if not the letter, would surely cover this case.” Id. The Supreme 
Court affirmed on other grounds. With regard to uniformity, the Court said only: 
It is forcibly argued that it is beyond the power of Congress to pass a law of the 
character in question solely for the District of Columbia, because whenever 
Congress acts upon the subject, the regulations it establishes must constitute a 
system applicable to the whole country, but the disposition of this case calls for 
no expression of opinion upon that point. 
Stoutenburgh, 129 U.S. at 148. 
137  The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 420 (1849). 
138  Ward, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 431. 
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commerce power”?139 What accounts for the Court’s 180-degree re-
versal? 
As we shall see, this sea change can be traced to the Court’s 
treatment of a series of pre-Prohibition laws regulating the distri-
bution of alcoholic beverages in dry states.140 Although this line of 
cases began by championing the uniformity principle, it ended with 
an intemperate dictum that led the Court to mistakenly assassinate 
the principle altogether. 
But first, a little background: As noted above, the Framers de-
sired uniformity in commercial regulations for two reasons: effi-
ciency and nondiscrimination. To many of the Framers, these rea-
sons represented two sides of the same coin. Requiring a single 
standard to be applied nationwide is both efficient—it precludes 
commercial bickering and undercutting among the states—and 
fair—it ensures that all states are subject to the same rules and 
therefore precludes the powerful states from using their influence 
in Congress to oppress their weaker rivals. To use the taxonomy 
set out above, the Framers desired both “uniform rules” and “uni-
form treatment.” 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, 
the efficiency rationale for uniformity in constitutional law began 
to erode, and thus the mandate for uniform rules faded away, leav-
ing only the requirement of uniform treatment. This erosion oc-
curred across the board, under the Uniformity Clause, the Bank-
ruptcy Clause, the Port Preference Clause, and the Commerce 
Clause. 
Consider first the Bankruptcy Clause, which empowers Congress 
to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.141 The earliest federal bank-
ruptcy laws, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
“categorically replaced the variant exemption policies of the states 
with a uniform federal rule . . . to combat the desperate commer-
cial straits of the nation.”142 These were uniform rules enacted in a 
139  Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939). 
140  A good summary of these cases can be found in Barry Cushman, Lochner, Liq-
uor and Longshoremen: A Puzzle in Progressive Era Federalism, 32 J. Mar. L. & 
Com. 1, 22–36 (2001). 
141  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
142  Koffler, supra note 99, at 43–44. 
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quest for efficiency—in Daniel Webster’s words, in an effort to 
tame a creditor relations system that had become “hydra-headed 
and the slave of four and twenty masters.”143
In the bankruptcy laws enacted in the late nineteenth century, 
however, Congress took the exact opposite approach, incorporat-
ing and preserving the various exemption laws that existed in the 
several states.144 As a result, the ultimate precepts of federal bank-
ruptcy law varied from state to state, depending on each state’s 
unique exemption provisions. Congress had abandoned uniform 
rules, and it saw no constitutional problem with doing so, choosing 
instead to view the Bankruptcy Clause’s requirement of “uniform 
Laws . . . on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States” as a mandate only for uniform treatment of the states. 
Senator Fessenden of Maine explained: 
The idea of some gentlemen is that the law, to be uniform, must 
be equal in its operations. I do not hold to that idea at all. If we 
make a rule which operates upon the States equally, that is to 
say, which is equal in its terms, so far as the States are concerned, 
it would not be unconstitutional simply because, owing to the 
particular provisions of the several States, the operation would 
not be precisely similar.145
The Supreme Court, when it confronted the issue in 1902, 
agreed with Senator Fessenden and the Congress.146 The Court’s 
opinion is somewhat muddled in its reasoning, but nonetheless 
clear in its conclusion: the uniformity required by the Bankruptcy 
Clause “is geographical and not personal,” and therefore a bank-
ruptcy law is, “in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the 
United States” even when differences in incorporated state laws 
produce nonidentical outcomes from state to state.147 In the follow-
ing decades, the Court reiterated that “[n]otwithstanding this re-
143  F. Regis Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution of the 
United States of America 111 (1918). 
144  See Koffler, supra note 99, at 51–54. Thus, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 
30 Stat. 544, 548 (repealed 1978), expressly disavowed any effect on “the allowance to 
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by . . . State laws.” 
145  Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 106–07 (1935). 
146  See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902). 
147  Id. at 188, 190. 
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quirement as to uniformity the bankruptcy acts of Congress may 
recognize the laws of the state in certain particulars, although such 
recognition may lead to different results in different States.”148
These cases ignored the efficiency rationale for uniformity149—
which, if aggressively pursued, would have yielded the opposite re-
sult—and instead focused solely on the nondiscrimination ration-
ale, pursuant to which uniform rules are unnecessary, as long as 
uniform treatment is preserved. In Senator Fessenden’s words, in-
corporating state law is permissible because the uniformity man-
date in the bankruptcy “provision of the Constitution unques-
tionably was intended to apply to the several States to prevent any 
distinction being made between them.”150
Around the same time, and for the same reasons, the Court 
reached a similar result in interpreting the Uniformity Clause. 
Early rhetoric surrounding the Uniformity Clause, which demands 
that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States,”151 emphasized not only nondiscrimination con-
cerns,152 but also efficiency concerns.153 After all, it was the ineffi-
148  Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). 
149  There is very little historical evidence of the Framers’ rationale for including the 
uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause. See Koffler, supra note 99, at 35–
37. According to Justice Story, the primary rationale was efficiency: 
It is obvious, that if the power is exclusively vested in the states, each one will 
be at liberty to frame such a system of legislation upon the subject of bank-
ruptcy and insolvency, as best suits its own local interests, and pursuits. Under 
such circumstances no uniformity of system or operations can be expected. 
3 Story, supra note 50, § 1102. Differences in state laws “may work gross injustice and 
inequality, and nourish feuds and discontents in neighbouring states.” 3 id. § 1102. 
There will always be found in every state a large mass of politicians, who will 
deem it more safe to consult their own temporary interests and popularity, by a 
narrow system of preferences, than to enlarge the boundaries, so as to give to 
distant creditors a fair share of the fortune of a ruined debtor. There can be no 
other adequate remedy, than giving a power to the general government, to in-
troduce and perpetuate a uniform system. 
3 Id. This rationale closely mirrors the efficiency rationale expressed by the Framers 
for demanding uniformity in the exercise of the commerce and taxation powers. See 
supra Part III. 
150  Warren, supra note 145, at 107. 
151  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
152  See supra Part III. 
153  See, e.g., 3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 116 (recounting Charles Pinckney’s expla-
nation at the Convention that “the complete power of regulating the trade of the Un-
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cient trade wars between the states that prompted demands for 
federal power to regulate and tax commercial shipments in the first 
place.154
But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, just as it 
had done with the Bankruptcy Clause, the Court abandoned the 
efficiency rationale and staked its uniformity claim entirely on 
principles of nondiscrimination. Indeed, at the turn of the century, 
the Court canvassed the historical record in some detail and con-
cluded, drawing in part on an 1884 interpretation of the Port Pref-
erence Clause,155 that “the possible discrimination against one or 
more States was the only thing intended to be provided for by the 
rule which uniformity imposed upon the power to levy duties, im-
posts and excises.”156 As such, the Court found no constitutional in-
firmity with federal tax laws that incorporated the laws of the sev-
eral states, even though federal tax liability varied from state to 
state as a result of their operation.157 Here again, the Court rejected 
ion, and levying such imposts and duties upon the same” was “to invest the United 
States with the power of rendering our maritime regulations uniform and efficient”). 
154  See supra Section III.A. 
155  See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1884). The Port Preference 
Clause is, self-evidently, purely a nondiscrimination provision. It was never intended 
to serve the goal of efficiency. In fact, Luther Martin, who proposed it, recognized 
that it might well be inefficient. See sources cited supra note 101. As discussed in Sec-
tion VI.B below, the nineteenth-century Court interpreted the Port Preference 
Clause to forbid only categorical, state-by-state discrimination. “[W]hat is forbidden 
is[] not discrimination between individual ports within the same or different States, 
but discrimination between States”—the favoring of all of the ports of one state over 
all of the ports of another. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 421, 435 (1855). This vision of the constitutional constraint as a prohibition 
against discrimination along state lines is consistent with the Court’s contemporary 
interpretations of the uniformity mandate under the Bankruptcy and Uniformity 
Clauses. 
156  Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 89 (1900) (emphasis added). 
157  For instance, in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927), the Court declared: 
The contention that the federal tax is not uniform because other states impose 
inheritance taxes while Florida does not, is without merit. Congress cannot ac-
commodate its legislation to the conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several 
states nor control the diverse conditions to be found in the various states which 
necessarily work unlike results from the enforcement of the same tax. 
As one commentator has explained, this discussion (though it may have been dicta) 
countenanced “a federal tax rate which explicitly varied by reference to th[e] ‘dissimi-
lar laws’” of the several states. Laurence Claus, “Uniform Throughout the United 
States”: Limits on Taxing as Limits on Spending, 18 Const. Comment. 517, 525 (2001); 
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demands for uniform rules, instead defining the constitutional 
mandate for uniformity in terms of uniform treatment alone. 
This denigration of the efficiency rationale for uniformity—with 
its consequent rejection of the mandate for uniform rules (but not 
uniform treatment)—was likewise reflected in the Court’s turn of 
the century Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In Leisy v. Hardin, 
the Court stunned the temperance movement by holding that the 
dormant Commerce Clause158 precluded dry states from forbidding 
the sale of alcoholic beverages that had been shipped in interstate 
commerce and remained in their original packages.159 According to 
the Court, because “interstate commerce, consisting in the trans-
portation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national 
in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system,” the 
“power controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot 
be encroached upon by the States.”160 But the Court went on to ex-
plain that Congress could choose to use its exclusive power in this 
see also, Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 102 (1942) (“Nor does the fact that the ul-
timate incidence of the federal estate tax is governed by state law violate the re-
quirement of geographical uniformity.”); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
583 (1937) (rejecting a Uniformity Clause challenge to a federal tax law that afforded 
a credit for contributions paid to certain state social security schemes); Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117–18 (1930) (holding that “differences of state law, which 
may bring a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable” 
do not violate the Uniformity Clause); cf. 26 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2001) (providing that 
punitive damages, which generally are included in income, may be excluded if they 
are awarded in a wrongful death action in a state which allows only punitive damages 
in those actions); Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 107–08 (explaining that differences in state 
testamentary and intestacy laws do not render a federal tax on legacies and distribu-
tive shares nonuniform). 
158  Although the Commerce Clause is, textually, simply an affirmative grant of 
power to Congress, the Court held early on that it also contains a “dormant” or 
“negative” component, precluding the states from regulating commerce in certain cir-
cumstances. These early holdings were themselves based on the recognition that prin-
ciples of uniformity underlie the Commerce Clause. The states cannot regulate in ar-
eas which necessitate “a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of 
the United States in every port.” Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 
319 (1851). 
159  135 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1890). 
160  Id. at 109. 
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arena to permit the states to decide for themselves whether to pro-
hibit the importation of alcoholic beverages.161
Congress accepted the Court’s offer and took up debate on the 
Wilson Act162—which allowed the states to preclude the sale of im-
ported liquor—shortly after the Leisy decision. Although it was ul-
timately enacted into law, the Wilson bill initially met with fierce 
congressional opposition on constitutional grounds.163 Significantly, 
the dispute between the bill’s opponents and proponents did not 
turn on whether the Commerce Clause mandated uniformity; eve-
ryone seemed to concede that it did.164 Rather, the dispute was over 
the meaning and extent of the uniformity requirement. 
The bill’s opponents advocated a constitutional mandate for uni-
form rules, not just uniform treatment, under the Commerce 
Clause. They argued that, notwithstanding the dicta from Leisy 
suggesting that Congress is empowered to authorize state regula-
tion of commercial matters that would otherwise demand a uni-
form rule, the Commerce Clause would not permit such a result:  
The object of Congressional regulation of commerce among the 
States was to secure ‘one system’ applicable to all the states. . . . 
Instead of having ‘one system,’ we shall have as many systems as 
there may be States. The laws and regulations prescribed by the 
States would be as various as the characteristics of their popula-
tion and wholly wanting in uniformity.165  
“The very object of this clause in the Constitution was to create 
uniformity,” the opposition charged, “and yet the [bill] would de-
stroy all uniformity.”166 The bill would “destroy the interstate-
commerce clause of the Constitution and all the purposes for which 
161  See id. at 108 (“[A] subject matter which has been confided exclusively to Con-
gress by the Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the police power of the 
State, unless placed there by congressional action.”). 
162  Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 
(2000)). 
163  See Cushman, supra note 140, at 25–26. 
164  See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 5369 (1890) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (“Uniformity in 
taxation, uniformity in the enactment of a bankrupt law, uniformity in the exercise of 
every branch of power that is confided to the Congress of the United States, seems to 
be a constitutional prerequisite of its exercise, and it ought to be.”). 
165  Id. app. at 437 (statement of Rep. Culberson). 
166  21 Cong. Rec. 4966 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest). 
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it was enacted originally, and so far from having uniformity we 
should have diversity and hostility.”167
Supporters of the bill countered that Congress can allow for 
nonuniform results without running afoul of the uniformity con-
straint on the commerce power. It was enough that the bill treated 
all states alike: “The effect of the bill, if it shall become a law, will 
be to leave every State in the Union free to determine for itself 
what its policy shall be in respect of the traffic in intoxicating liq-
uors.”168 This is constitutionally acceptable, as it “[g]iv[es] no pref-
erence to one State over another.”169
Like the bill’s supporters, the opposition also emphasized the 
need for uniform treatment and concurred that discriminating be-
tween states in the exercise of the commerce power was strictly 
forbidden. “What would you think of an act . . . of Congress over 
commerce among the States, discriminating in favor of one State 
and against another?” asked one senator, rhetorically.170 The an-
swer was self-evident: “That power does not exist in Congress. It is 
denied from the very nature of things in respect to commerce 
among the States.”171 But to the opposition, because the uniformity 
mandate extended beyond uniform treatment to uniform rules, the 
Commerce Clause would not countenance affording the states the 
opportunity to choose for themselves whether to allow the impor-
167  Id. at 4957; see also id. at 4955 (“Are we upon the dictum of the Supreme Court 
to tear down the barriers of the Constitution? . . . What is the meaning of the [Uniformity 
Clause]? It means exactly the same thing that [the Commerce Clause] means, that the 
Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the States.”); id. at 4966 
(noting that the Port Preference Clause “and this clause regulating commerce were 
based on the same idea to produce uniformity, equality among the States, and to do 
away with the evils which had existed under the old Articles of Confederation, . . . 
and we now propose to bring back that same state of things”); id. at 5325 (statement 
of Sen. Coke); id. at 5331 (statement of Sen. Eustis); id. app. at 494 (statement of 
Rep. Rogers). 
168  Id. at 4954 (statement of Sen. Wilson). 
169  Id. at 4965 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). At one point, Senator Edmunds ap-
peared to advocate the Supreme Court’s current position—that there is no uniformity 
limit whatsoever on the commerce power. See id. (“When it comes to the regulations 
of commerce as distinguished from the taxing power, no such limitation or reservation 
or proviso was imposed upon it.”). But his emphasis on the fact that the bill treats all 
states the same suggests that he was willing to concede a mandate for uniform treat-
ment, just not one for uniform rules. 
170  Id. at 5372 (statement of Sen. Morgan). 
171  Id. at 5371. 
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tation of goods: “That the State discriminated against consents to 
the discrimination can make no difference, as we have seen. It is 
not in the power of a State to give force and validity even within its 
own borders to an act of Congress passed in violation of the Con-
stitution.”172
Once enacted, the Wilson Act was quickly challenged in court. 
Echoing the arguments of the congressional opposition, the chal-
lengers contended that the law was unconstitutional because it 
“lacks the element of uniformity, which . . . is an indispensable req-
uisite of the regulation of inter-State commerce.”173 The term “uni-
formity” was used here in the sense of uniform rules, not just uni-
form treatment: “[I]t was contemplated by the Framers of the 
constitution that any law enacted by Congress in the exercise of the 
[commerce power] should be uniform in its operation.”174 Thus, ex-
ercises of the commerce power must result in “a uniform rule of 
regulation throughout the country.”175 Allowing the states to 
choose for themselves whether to regulate therefore violates the 
uniformity mandate: “If some of the States should have laws that 
would reach the subject, and others not, which is and ever will be 
the case, then there would always be that want of uniformity of 
regulation . . . which we have seen is a requisite of any regulation 
of inter-State commerce.”176
Opposing counsel defended the constitutionality of the Wilson 
Act on the ground that it was uniform to the extent mandated by 
the Commerce Clause:177 “It is a regulation of commerce, uniform 
and general in its operation” in that it applies equally to all of the 
states; “the want of uniformity,” to the extent that there was one, 
172  Id. at 4956 (statement of Sen. Vest, quoting a report by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee). 
173  Brief for the Appellee at 19, Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (No. 
1529). 
174  Id. at 40. 
175  Id. at 22. 
176  Id. at 24–25. 
177  Actually, counsel was unwilling to concede the existence of any sort of uniform-
ity constraint on the commerce power. See Brief for the Appellant at 16, Rahrer (No. 
1529) (“The constitution does not require that the regulation of interstate commerce 
shall be uniform throughout the several States. But if it did, this statute is not open to 
objection upon that account.”). 
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resulted from divergent state laws, which did not affect the consti-
tutionality of the federal statute.178
In Wilkerson v. Rahrer,179 the Court agreed, holding, as its prior 
decision in Leisy had suggested, that a law allowing all of the states 
to regulate as they saw fit did not violate the Commerce Clause. 
Although its opinion is a bit cursory on the point, the Court 
strongly implied that the Commerce Clause does indeed contain a 
uniformity mandate, but one limited (like its counterparts in the 
Bankruptcy and Uniformity Clauses) only to nondiscrimination be-
tween the states: “[Congress] has taken its own course and made its 
own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce 
one common rule, whose uniformity is not affected by variations in 
state laws in dealing with such property.”180 In other words, in the 
relevant constitutional sense, the federal statute was uniform in 
that it applied equally in every state (uniform treatment); it was 
only a difference in state laws that led to nonuniformity in the alco-
hol market (nonuniform rules). And that difference was not of a 
constitutional dimension. 
When the Wilson Act proved ineffective, Congress enacted 
(over a presidential veto) the Webb-Kenyon Act,181 which prohib-
ited the shipment of alcohol into dry states. As with the Wilson 
Act, the congressional opposition to the Webb-Kenyon Act argued 
that the law “would subvert the whole intent, spirit, and purpose of 
the commerce clause, which is essentially to establish a uniform 
system.”182 That concern was echoed by President Taft, who de-
clared in his veto message that 
[i]t was certainly intended by that clause to secure uniformity in 
the regulation of commerce between the States. To suspend that 
purpose and to permit the States to exercise their old authority 
178  Id. at 14. 
179  140 U.S. 545, 562–65 (1891). 
180  Id. at 561. The Court explained that “the object was undoubtedly sought to be 
attained [by the Commerce Clause] of preventing commercial regulations partial in 
their character or contrary to the common interests.” Id. 
181  Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699–700 (1913) (codified as amended at 27 
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)). 
182  49 Cong. Rec. 2904 (1913) (statement of Sen. (and future Justice) Sutherland). 
The primary opposition to the law focused on an argument that it violated the non-
delegation doctrine. See Cushman, supra note 140, at 28–29. 
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before they became States, to interfere with commerce between 
them and their neighbors, is to defeat the constitutional pur-
pose.183
In James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway 
Co.,184 the Court rejected these concerns and sustained the constitu-
tionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act—hardly a surprising result, as 
both Leisy and Rahrer had already conclusively answered these 
constitutional objections. Still, the curious and unfortunate way in 
which the Court went about rejecting these arguments sowed the 
seeds of the evisceration of the uniformity constraint on the com-
merce power. 
Relying on its prior decisions in Leisy and Rahrer, the Court 
made short work of the claim that a statute of this nature is non-
uniform: 
So far as uniformity is concerned, there is no question that the 
act uniformly applies to the conditions which call its provisions 
into play—that its provisions apply to all the States,—so that the 
question really is a complaint as to the want of uniform existence 
of things to which the act applies and not to an absence of uni-
formity in the act itself.185
In other words, the uniformity required by the Constitution is uni-
form treatment, not uniform rules—the very same conclusion that 
the Court had recently reached under both the Uniformity Clause 
and the Bankruptcy Clause. 
So far so good. Unfortunately, although the issue was therefore 
settled, the Court immediately added, seemingly as an afterthought: 
“But aside from this it is obvious that the argument seeks to en-
graft upon the Constitution a restriction not found in it; that is, that 
the power to regulate conferred upon Congress obtains subject to 
the requirement that regulations enacted shall be uniform through-
out the United States.”186
183  49 Cong. Rec. 4292 (1913). 
184  242 U.S. 311, 332 (1917). 
185  Id. at 326–27. 
186  Id. at 327. 
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What did the Court mean by this? It appears, based on the rest 
of the paragraph and the paragraphs that follow, that when the 
Court declared that the Commerce Clause does not require laws to 
be “uniform throughout the United States,” it was speaking only of 
uniform rules, not uniform treatment. In other words, the Court 
meant only to say that the Commerce Clause does not mandate 
uniform rules. We can determine this because the Court explained 
that it was rejecting “the argument relied upon” by the President 
and the Attorney General.187 Their 
sole claim [was] that the act was not within the power given to 
Congress to regulate because it submitted liquors to the control 
of the States by subjecting interstate commerce in such liquors to 
present and future state prohibitions, and hence in the nature of 
things was wanting in uniformity.188
This is an argument for uniform rules, not uniform treatment. 
What is more, the Court then went on to examine the Leisy 
opinion in some detail, and concluded that Leisy “plainly refutes” 
the uniformity argument before the Court.189 Leisy, it will be re-
called, had rejected the idea that the Commerce Clause requires 
uniform rules, but had nonetheless acknowledged the constitu-
tional mandate that interstate commerce “must be governed by a 
uniform system”190—a mandate that both Congress and the Court 
had understood to require uniform treatment. Even those legisla-
tors who agreed with Leisy’s rejection of uniform rules had con-
ceded that uniform treatment was still required. 
If the Court had meant to go further—to refer to (and reject) a 
mandate for uniform treatment under the Commerce Clause—any 
such discussion would have been quintessential dicta. The Webb-
Kenyon Act in fact treated all states equally, and no one had sug-
187  Id. 
188  Id. at 326. 
189  Id. at 327–30. Leisy refutes the argument for uniform rules because it necessarily 
stands for the proposition that, even with regard to matters on which the dormant 
Commerce Clause precludes the states (in the absence of federal legislation) from 
adopting nonuniform rules, Congress is nonetheless empowered to step in and au-
thorize the states to enact disparate regulations. 
190  Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1890). 
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gested (or even had any reason to suggest) that the Commerce 
Clause did not require uniformity of that sort. 
As such, it hardly seems likely that the Court intended to ven-
ture an opinion on the question of uniform treatment. Rather, 
what the Court appears to have meant is this: this statute is uni-
form because it treats all of the states the same. Those who de-
mand more—that a single, uniform rule must ultimately apply to 
individuals in every state—are asking for something that the Con-
stitution does not require. 
Still, the meaning apparently intended by the Court is not the 
most obvious and natural reading of the language actually em-
ployed. This passage from James Clark Distilling creates the im-
mediate impression that the Commerce Clause does not require 
any kind of uniformity at all—neither uniform rules, nor uniform 
treatment. That the Court chose this language to convey a very dif-
ferent point (a rejection of only uniform rules), suggests that the 
Justices failed even to contemplate the possible existence of a uni-
form treatment objection to a federal law. Had they considered 
that objection, they would have chosen their words more carefully. 
But they did not. In its rush to convincingly spurn a losing and 
outmoded argument for uniform rules, the Court appears to have 
lost sight altogether of the notion of constitutional uniformity—
uniform treatment—that it had recently articulated in reference to 
the bankruptcy and tax powers, and that it had long held to be ap-
plicable to the commerce power. 
That was an unfortunate oversight, for in subsequent cases, the 
Court took this passage from James Clark Distilling at face value, 
interpreting it to reject not only a mandate for uniform rules, but 
also one for uniform treatment. It was this naked statement—at 
best dysfunctionally inarticulate, at worst an ill-considered and er-
roneous dictum—that alone spawned the line of cases recounting 
the principle that there is no uniformity requirement in the exer-
cise of the commerce power.191 Based solely on this authority (and a 
191  See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1939) (relying solely on James Clark 
Distilling and on the absence of the word “uniform” in the Commerce Clause as con-
trasted with the Uniformity Clause); Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 
604, 616 (1950) (relying on the same authorities); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 
(1981) (relying solely on Central Roig and Currin); Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. 
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superficial textual comparison between the Commerce Clause and 
the Uniformity and Bankruptcy Clauses), the Court declared in 
1950 that Congress was free to impose quotas limiting the amount 
of sugar produced in various domestic geographic regions that 
could be offered for sale in the continental United States.192 The 
proposition that there is no uniformity constraint whatsoever in the 
Commerce Clause, and that Congress is therefore free to discrimi-
nate between the states in the exercise of the commerce power—a 
proposition directly contrary to a century-and-a-half-old under-
standing of the scope of that power—had taken root. By the 1980s, 
the Court took it as a given that the uniformity—uniform treat-
ment—mandated by the Bankruptcy and Uniformity Clauses is not 
mandated by the Commerce Clause.193
V. TOWARD A MORE SENSIBLE MODERN RULE 
To summarize, the Court’s current rule is the product of vulgar 
textualism, forgotten history, and sloppy opinion writing—hardly 
an illustrious pedigree. Still, why is all of that not just water under 
the bridge? The law often evolves in less-than-intellectually im-
pressive ways, but it evolves nonetheless. What is the necessity 
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) (relying on Central Roig, Hodel, and a textual 
comparison of the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause). 
192  Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. at 606, 616. The briefs in Central Roig illustrate the 
disappearance of the uniformity constraint on the commerce power. One brief argues 
in passing that, because the Commerce Clause was “intended to establish a single na-
tional economy,” the challenged statute “runs directly contrary to the economic the-
ory which animates the Constitution.” Brief for the Gov’t of P.R. at 108, Cent. Roig 
Ref. Co. (No. 32). But the central thrust of the constitutional challenge to the statute 
essentially conceded the lack of a uniformity constraint by arguing that the discrimi-
nation was so arbitrary as to violate what would come to be known as the equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause. See Brief for the Respondents Cent. 
Roig Refining Co. and Western Sugar Refining Co. at 32–33, Cent. Roig Ref. Co. (No. 
30). The briefs on the other side cited Currin v. Wallace for the proposition that there 
is no requirement of uniformity under the Commerce Clause. See Brief for the 
American Sugar Refining Co., et al., Respondents-Intervenors at 26–27, Cent. Roig 
Ref. Co. (No. 27). 
193  See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 468, 470–71, 475 (“Unlike the Com-
merce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or 
restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the 
United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required by the 
Commerce Clause.”); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 332. 
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of—or the point in—going backwards? After all, it might seem the 
height of folly to concern ourselves with what the Framers thought 
about the commerce power, given the fact that our contemporary 
understanding of the nature and scope of that power is so radically 
different from that of the framing generation. As I hope to demon-
strate, however, in this particular regard, the original intent should 
still matter, even if we embrace the expansive modern reading of 
the Commerce Clause. 
A. Originalism 
To be clear, in emphasizing the importance of the intent of the 
Framers, I do not mean to invoke the notion of “originalism” as or-
thodoxy in constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, on this 
particular issue, originalism might, ironically, produce a result that 
strays unacceptably far from history. 
An old-fashioned originalist—one who interprets the Constitu-
tion to reflect for all time the original, subjective intent of the 
Framers—would surely be tempted to say, in light of the evidence 
presented above, that the Constitution imposes a uniformity con-
straint on the exercise of the commerce power.194 Most self-professed 
originalists today, however, subscribe to a theory of “original mean-
ing” rather than “original intent.” That is to say, they seek to inter-
pret the Constitution according to the original, objective meaning 
of the text, rather than the subjective meaning that one or even all 
of the Framers may have intended.195 According to Justice Scalia, 
194  See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 
Cornell L. Rev. 350, 350–51 (1988); Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, Ad-
dress Before the District of Columbia Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Di-
vision 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 22, 26 (1985) (“Where there is a demonstrable consensus 
among the Framers and ratifiers as to a principle stated or implied by the Constitu-
tion, it should be followed.”). Of course, an originalist of this stripe, if she sticks to her 
guns, would also limit the commerce power to the narrow scope contemplated by the 
Framers, such that any discriminatory exercise of that power would violate the plain 
language of either the Uniformity Clause or the Port Preference Clause, see supra 
Section III.B.2, and such that most of the modern statutes enacted under the com-
merce power would be unconstitutional regardless of whether they are nonuniform. 
As such, the point would essentially be moot. 
195  For a thorough discussion of the evolution of originalism from a subjective to an 
objective inquiry, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. 
L. Rev. 611, 620–29 (1999). For a detailed history of originalism, including an excel-
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the most outspoken and influential champion of this interpretive 
theory,196 the proper inquiry is a search “for a sort of ‘objectified’ 
intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the 
text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus ju-
ris . . . . Government by unexpressed intent is . . . tyrannical. It is 
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”197 Judge Bork 
has expanded on this point: 
Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the 
Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, that is actu-
ally a shorthand formulation, because what the ratifiers under-
stood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the 
public of that time would have understood the words to mean. It 
is important to be clear about this. The search is not for a subjec-
tive intention. If someone found a letter from George Washing-
ton to Martha telling her that what he meant by the power to lay 
taxes was not what other people meant, that would not change 
our reading of the Constitution in the slightest. Nor would the 
subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying convention 
alter anything. When lawmakers use words, the law that results is 
what those words ordinarily mean.198
Modern originalists are, in other words, primarily textualists. 
This emphasis on textual meaning would seemingly lead a mod-
ern originalist to reject a generalized uniformity constraint on the 
commerce power, notwithstanding the historical support outlined 
above. Even though the Framers intended such a constraint to ex-
ist, the fact remains that, as the Constitution ended up being writ-
lent summary of the writings and beliefs of modern textual originalists, see Vasan Ke-
savan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003). Of course, there are a variety of 
distinct interpretative theories that might be said to fall under the broad tent of mod-
ern textualism and originalism. It is certainly possible that not all originalists and tex-
tualists would agree as to the proper resolution of the issue at hand. 
196  See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 
(1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Interpretation]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, Address at the University of Cincinnati 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Scalia, Originalism]. 
197  Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 196, at 17. 
198  Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
144 (1990). 
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ten, the Commerce Clause contains no express uniformity limita-
tion, the Uniformity Clause applies on its face only to “Duties, Im-
posts and Excises,” and the Port Preference Clause forbids only 
the giving of preferences “to the Ports of one state over those of 
another.” An objective reading of these texts does not yield a pro-
hibition against nonuniform regulations of commerce, except 
where those regulations take the form of taxes or operate as a 
preference for the ports of a particular state. The subjective inten-
tions of the Framers to the contrary are, to the modern, textual 
originalist, irrelevant.199
It is true, of course, that originalists regularly consult historical 
sources, including many of the sources cited above, to discern the 
original meaning of the constitutional text.200 But much of the his-
torical evidence relied upon above would not be helpful to the 
originalist enterprise. This material—evidence, in Judge Bork’s 
words, of “the subjective intentions of all the members of a ratify-
ing convention,”201 rather than evidence of the original, objective 
meaning of the text—is off-limits to today’s originalists. There is, 
for instance, no way that a typical citizen202 in 1787 could have 
known of the entwined histories at the Convention of the Uniform-
ity Clause, the Port Preference Clause, and the Commerce 
Clause.203 The proceedings at the Convention had, after all, been 
199  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1119, 1119 (1998) (explaining that “the project of textualism is to deny that 
intent should matter . . . and to affirm the primacy of text”). 
200  See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s 
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 217 (2004). 
201  Bork, supra note 198, at 144.
202  Although the originalists have not reached a consensus about whose understand-
ing of the meaning of the text should be dispositive, they tend to focus on the under-
standing of a hypothetical typical citizen, or perhaps a typical voter at a state ratifica-
tion convention. See id. at 220–21, 226–27. 
203  See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 195, at 1115–16 (recounting the “conven-
tional wisdom” among modern originalists that “the Constitution’s secret drafting his-
tory should not be admissible evidence in proving propositions about constitutional 
meaning”). Kesavan and Paulsen take issue with the modern consensus, but for the 
most part only on the ground that these sources are often useful in “provid[ing] im-
portant evidence of the way informed eighteenth-century Americans understood and 
used the language of the Constitution.” Id. at 1186–87. In other words, they are useful 
only to the extent that they can help to clarify the objective meaning of the text. See 
id. at 1198–1214; id. at 1201 (“If we are trying to prove that a constitutional word or 
phrase means X, the secret drafting history may help to confirm that the ordinary us-
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shrouded in the strictest secrecy.204 And, as it happens, the sources 
that are most compelling to the originalists—the Federalist Papers 
and other records from the ratification debates205—are the least 
helpful here. There was comparatively little discussion of the uni-
formity mandate in the public ratification debate. 
Still, one could certainly argue, given the widely known histori-
cal context, that reasonable citizens would have believed a uni-
formity constraint—whether or not it was explicitly articulated in 
the text—to be inherent in the very nature of a federal commerce 
power. The lack of uniformity was, after all, the catalyst for the 
Convention, and everyone was well aware of the overwhelming de-
sire to prohibit federal discrimination among the states. But to a 
textualist, such an argument strays dangerously far from the consti-
tutional text; if uniformity is an inherent limit on a federal power 
of this nature, why does the Constitution contain an explicit uni-
formity constraint in some related clauses?206 Subordinating these 
textual differences between clauses to a claim of unwritten, implicit 
meaning would seem to defeat the principal purpose of the new 
originalism—to constrain the will of judges through reliance on the 
objective meaning of the text.207 
Of course, in other circumstances, prominent modern original-
ists have been known to travel well beyond the constitutional 
age of a constitutional word or phrase is indeed X.”). Kesavan and Paulsen would 
presumably not place substantial weight on evidence from the Convention that indi-
cates that the Framers intended a result that was not conveyed by the original, objec-
tive meaning of the text. 
204  See Collier & Collier, supra note 60, at 83–84. 
205  See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 196, at 38. 
206  Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976–78 (1991) (Scalia, J., separate opin-
ion) (arguing that because the Framers were aware of explicit bars on disproportion-
ate punishment in state constitutions, the omission of an explicit bar in the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted as intentional); Amar, supra note 49, passim (ad-
vocating a textualist theory of constitutional interpretation that determines meaning 
by comparing the language of different clauses). 
207  See Smith, supra note 200, at 223–24, 229–30; David A. Strauss, The New Textu-
alism in Constitutional Law, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153, 1156 (1998) (“Many of the 
most prominent exponents of textualism—notably Justice Black a generation ago and 
Justice Scalia today—urge that departing from the text permits judges too much lee-
way to read their own views into the law.”). 
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text.208 To the extent that those deviations can be reconciled at all 
with the textual originalist enterprise,209 however, they do not ap-
pear to be sufficiently analogous to serve as precedents for aban-
doning the text on the issue at hand. For when it comes to the uni-
formity constraint, there is no tradition of stare decisis upon which 
to justify a deviation from the text,210 there is no long-standing and 
widely known historical practice that pre-dates the framing,211 and 
there are, in fact, provisions of the text that speak to the issue at 
hand.212
If the originalists are going to adopt a uniformity constraint on 
the commerce power, they will likely do so based on the theory 
that sometimes two wrongs make a right. Originalists believe that 
the modern expansion of the commerce power is inconsistent with 
the original meaning of the text. That is the first wrong, but it is a 
wrong in which the originalists have acquiesced. Virtually every 
modern originalist has expressed a willingness (or at least a resig-
nation) to accept at least some of the modern expansion of the 
208  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (holding, on 
the basis of history, that the Constitution precludes the federal government from re-
quiring state executive officials to perform acts in service of a federal statutory pro-
gram); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30–35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (refusing to abide by the narrow text of the Eleventh 
Amendment on the ground that that amendment was drafted on the assumption of 
the existence of a broader immunity principle). 
209  For suggestions that they cannot, see Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the 
Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 953, 969–71 
(1999), Martin H. Redish, Taking a Stroll Through Jurassic Park: Neutral Principles 
and the Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 88 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 165, 169 n.31 (1993). 
210  Cf. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495–96 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the 
Hans v. Louisiana Court’s nontextual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
should not be disturbed because Congress has been relying on it for a century). 
211  Cf. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (endorsing a broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, based on the 
idea that “the Eleventh Amendment was important not merely for what it said but for 
what it reflected: a consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as 
well as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against 
which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not 
mean to sweep away”). 
212  Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to 
this precise question, the answer . . . must be sought in historical understanding and 
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”). 
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commerce power beyond the narrow scope contemplated by the 
framing generation.213 It is only because of this first wrong that the 
lack of an express uniformity constraint in the Commerce Clause 
matters; as noted above, if the commerce power were constrained 
to its eighteenth-century scope, the Port Preference Clause and the 
Uniformity Clause would be sufficient to enforce the uniformity 
mandate.214 It is quite possible that, in order to preserve a textual 
limitation on discrimination between the states that is no longer 
adequate in the face of what they perceive to be an illegitimate ex-
pansion of federal power, the originalists would compound the sin 
of disregarding the original plain meaning of the scope of the 
commerce power by also disregarding the plain textual limitations 
on the uniformity constraint. 
That would certainly be a plausible thing for an originalist to do. 
But one wonders whether the lure of the plain text, and the general 
impetus to move closer to, not further from, original meaning 
would simply prove too compelling to overcome.215 If so, then I re-
spectfully part company with the originalists. To capitulate to the 
narrow text here is to miss the forest for the trees, and to arrive at 
a result demonstrably at odds with a historical backdrop that—for 
reasons that I will explain shortly—should play a central role in de-
termining constitutional meaning. It is ironic then that in one of the 
rare instances in which the history might actually be clear enough 
213  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (observing that “case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the 
Commerce Clause” and recommending that in the future, the Court ought “to temper 
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more 
recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause”); 
Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s 
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 849, 851 (2002) (“[T]hat the 
scope of the commerce power has expanded so far beyond the original understanding 
of that power’s boundaries that any attempt to adhere strictly to its original meaning 
today would likely be futile and inappropriate.”). See generally Scalia, Originalism, 
supra note 196, at 861 (“[A]lmost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with 
the doctrine of stare decisis.”). 
214  See supra Section III.B.2. 
215  Cf. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 204 (1990) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (“I decline to adopt [a rule of prospective decisionmaking] 
because, as I have discussed above, such a mode of action is fundamentally beyond 
judicial power—and although ‘negative’ Commerce Clause decisionmaking is as well, 
two wrongs do not make a right.”). 
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to provide concrete answers to real questions,216 there is a danger 
that the originalists would choose to ignore it. 
B. A Better Role for History 
As the foregoing makes clear, to reject orthodox originalism in 
this instance (and others, for that matter) is not to suggest that his-
torical evidence is irrelevant in constitutional interpretation. The 
notion that those who do not swallow whole the originalist credo 
must instead subscribe to an “original-meaning-is-irrelevant, good-
policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence”217 is largely a 
boogeyman of the originalists’ own making. In truth, as Professor 
Farber has explained, “[a]lmost no one believes that the original 
understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional in-
terpretation.”218
Most modern interpreters of the Constitution, including most of 
the Justices of the Supreme Court in the last century, have spurned 
orthodox originalism in favor of a more flexible constitutionalism, 
one that takes to heart Chief Justice John Marshall’s admonition 
that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing.”219 According to Marshall, the Constitution, by “[i]ts nature . . . 
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its impor-
tant objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects them-
selves.”220 It was “intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”221
216  This is one of the most frequently expressed criticisms of originalism—that the 
historical sources rarely yield a clear answer. See Smith, supra note 200, at 225, 230–
31. 
217  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
218  Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989); see also Barnett, supra note 195, at 611–29 (detailing the 
modern consensus that the historical understanding matters in constitutional interpre-
tation); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 877, 880–81 (1996) (noting that “[e]veryone agrees that the text of the Constitu-
tion matters” and “[v]irtually everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the 
Framers count for something”). 
219  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
220  Id. 
221  Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted). 
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Because the Constitution was so intended, most modern consti-
tutional theorists are inclined to “take the Framers’ understanding 
at a certain level of abstraction or generality.”222 In Justice Bren-
nan’s words, “[t]he Framers discerned fundamental principles 
through struggles against particular malefactions of the Crown; the 
struggle shapes the particular contours of the articulated principles. 
But our acceptance of the fundamental principles has not and 
should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic con-
tours.”223 Thus, to “remain faithful to the content of the Constitu-
tion,” we cannot be slaves to the narrow, original meaning of the 
text.224
Most modern constitutional theorists care a great deal about the 
original meaning of the text and the original intent of the Framers, 
not necessarily as conclusions, but rather as sources (along with the 
case law that has been developed under the Constitution) from 
which to distill primary constitutional principles—the fundamental 
values and limitations that the Constitution was meant to protect 
and enact. These broad principles are then continuously refined 
and adapted to govern the contemporary problems of an ever-
changing world.225
On this view, the narrow original meaning of the text is not the 
beginning and the end of constitutional decisionmaking. Rather, 
the constitutional meaning is capable of being informed and 
shaped by American history, both before and after the framing. As 
such, it matters that the Framers believed something, even if they 
did not clearly and objectively express that belief in the text. Their 
beliefs can help us understand, at a suitably broad level of abstrac-
tion, the values that are reflected in the words that they did include 
222  Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 311, 
313 (1996). 
223  William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, Address at Georgetown University 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2, 6 (1985). 
224  Id. 
225  This basic belief takes many forms and has been articulated in countless different 
ways. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1955); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Transla-
tion, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1182–88 (1993); Strauss, supra note 218, at 881; Sunstein, 
supra note 222, at 314–15. There are nearly as many alternatives to orthodox original-
ism as there are law professors, and it is not my purpose here to endorse any one of 
them. 
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in the Constitution—values that should continue to govern today’s 
problems, unless there is a valid reason for abandoning them.226
If we step back to this level of generality, the lack of a clear tex-
tual expression of the general uniformity constraint of the com-
merce power is by no means dispositive.227 Indeed, this may be the 
226  Cf. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 195, at 1126 (noting that non-originalists of-
ten rely on the Constitution’s “secret drafting history” as a useful tool for determining 
a historical baseline of constitutional meaning). 
227  In fact, in far less compelling circumstances, the Court has already implied a uni-
formity constraint on a federal power that contains no such express limitation. To-
gether, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, which extends the federal judicial power to cases in 
admiralty, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, em-
power Congress to enact rules of admiralty law. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 
205, 214–15 (1917). The “fundamental purpose” of the admiralty jurisdiction provi-
sion was to “preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to 
maritime matters and bring them within the control of the Federal Government.” 
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920); see also 3 Elliot’s De-
bates, supra note 57, at 532 (quoting Madison’s statement at the Virginia Ratification 
Convention that “[t]o the same principles may also be referred their cognizance in 
admiralty and maritime cases. As our intercourse with foreign nations will be affected 
by decisions of this kind, they ought to be uniform.”); 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 
57, at 571 (quoting Edmund Randolph’s statement at the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention that “[c]ases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . . ought . . . to be uni-
form; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen distinct, independent ju-
risdictions—this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal judiciary.” (emphasis 
omitted)). For this reason, the Court has long held—notwithstanding the fact that the 
Constitution nowhere mentions a uniformity requirement in admiralty—that Con-
gress is precluded from enacting nonuniform rules of maritime law; to allow Congress 
to do so “would defeat the very purpose of the grant” of federal power. Knicker-
bocker Ice, 253 U.S. at 164. 
 Knickerbocker Ice has been discredited, see Ceres Terminals, Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm’n of Ill., 53 F.3d 183, 184 (7th Cir. 1995), but not because of its prohibition on 
nonuniform maritime laws. Rather, its disrepute stems from its impermissibly strin-
gent understanding of the mandate of uniformity. Knickerbocker Ice held that, be-
cause of the uniformity constraint, Congress could not incorporate diverse state stan-
dards into federal admiralty law. 253 U.S. at 164. That strict reading of the 
constitutional uniformity mandate as requiring uniform rules is inconsistent with gen-
eral uniformity law, see supra Part IV, and the Court would likely reject it today. See 
Wash. v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 234–35 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the notion that Congress may not incorporate state law when enact-
ing maritime regulations is inconsistent with the prevailing conception of uniformity 
in other areas of constitutional law); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Vali-
date Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. 
L. Rev. 387, 405 (1983) (“Knickerbocker Ice Co. was thus wrongly decided, even if 
one grants Justice McReynolds his dubious premise that the Constitution requires na-
tionally uniform law when maritime law is federal. . . . It was [the conception that a 
uniformity mandate precludes Congress from incorporating state law], rather than a 
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paradigmatic example of a fundamental constitutional value that is 
not clearly reflected in the text. 
Professor Tribe has cautioned against a modern constitutional 
textualism that interprets isolated clauses with insufficient atten-
tion to matters of constitutional structure and historical back-
ground, thereby placing undue weight on the absence of a particu-
lar limiting word in the text.228 Such caution is especially 
appropriate when the history gives us reason to believe that the 
Constitution would never have been ratified if it had been gener-
ally understood that the lack of the limiting word was intentional 
and significant.229
That is the situation here. The uniformity constraint on the 
commerce power was of the utmost importance to the framing 
generation, and it is highly unlikely that the Constitution would 
have been proposed or ratified without it.230
What is more, the historical evidence, along with the structure 
and drafting history of Article I, belies any significance to the ab-
sence of the word “uniform” from the Commerce Clause.231 As ex-
plained above, the provision that ultimately became the Uniform-
ity Clause originally mandated uniformity in both taxes and 
commercial regulations, in accordance with the Madisonian pro-
posal that prompted the Convention in the first place, and with the 
Framers’ understanding that the power to regulate commerce and 
the power to tax commerce were one and the same. It was only 
through inadvertent stylistic tinkering that the Constitution as en-
acted did not contain an express uniformity limitation on all com-
mercial regulations. 
requirement that national laws be uniform, that doomed Congress’s attempt to return 
power to the states.” (emphasis omitted)). 
228  See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on 
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1239–45 
(1995) (criticizing Professors Ackerman and Amar for placing significant weight on 
the lack of the word “only” in certain clauses where the constitutional structure and 
historical background make clear that those clauses were meant to be exclusive). 
229  See id. at 1243. 
230  See 3 Farrand, supra note 79, at 365–66 (quoting Rep. Williamson’s statement 
that “I do not hazard much in saying, that the present Constitution had never been 
adopted without those preliminary guards in it.”). 
231  See supra Part III. 
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That omission was of no consequence to the Framers. Given 
their narrow understanding of the scope of the commerce power—
which they imagined to extend only to the power to tax commer-
cial shipping and to regulate commercial sea shipping and naviga-
tion—they had reason to believe that the combined effect of the 
Commerce Clause, the Uniformity Clause, and the Port Preference 
Clause was to effectuate fully the Madisonian proposal. That is to 
say, they had reason to believe that those clauses were sufficient to 
grant Congress plenary authority to tax and regulate commercial 
matters, but to require that all such regulations be uniform.232
Today, however, as our understanding of the scope of the com-
merce power has expanded well beyond the original meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, the sum of the three parts, as each is cur-
rently understood, no longer adds up to the entire whole. We cur-
rently read the power to “regulate Commerce” extremely broadly, 
but we continue to confine the uniformity constraint to the narrow 
confines of “Duties, Imposts and Excises” under the Uniformity 
Clause and “Preferences to the Ports of one State over those of 
another” under the Port Preference Clause. That leaves all other 
regulations enacted under the commerce power—which constitute 
the vast majority of modern federal regulatory statutes—
unconstrained by a uniformity limitation. 
This makes little sense. If we read the Commerce Clause more 
broadly today than the Framers originally intended, we should 
make sure that we read the clauses that establish the core limita-
tion on that power broadly enough to keep up. Otherwise, we end 
up with a particularly perverse result. As the Framers were jealous 
enough to ensure that the limited, eighteenth-century commerce 
power could not be misused to prejudice individual states, we can 
safely assume that, had they been aware of the extent to which that 
power would be expanded in the future—to approach a plenary 
federal police power—they would have been doubly terrified by 
the potential for regional favoritism. 
We should not let the Framers’ stylistic choice of wording—
perfectly sensible at the time, but unfortunate in light of subse-
quent, unforeseen developments—stand in the way of what was 
232  See supra Section III.B.2. 
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perhaps their single most fundamental concern at the Convention. 
To do so would be to read the Constitution like an ordinary stat-
ute—to “forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” rather 
than a “legal code”—and to elevate the text to a conclusive status 
that it does not, and should not, hold in matters of constitutional 
law. Rather, we should extract from the text and drafting history of 
the Commerce Clause, the Uniformity Clause, and the Port Pref-
erence Clause, and from the additional, compelling evidence of his-
torical context and original intent, a broader, more general princi-
ple of constitutional law: that Congress may not discriminate 
among states in its exercise of the commerce power, however 
broadly the contours of that power come to be understood. Only 
then do we ensure that the broad animating principles of the Con-
stitution remain relevant and vital through the changing course of 
history.233
C. A Sensible Rule 
Inferring a mandate in the Commerce Clause for uniform treat-
ment, but not for uniform rules, might appear to be at least par-
tially inconsistent with the very history upon which I am relying. It 
was, after all, the desire for uniform rules that prompted the Con-
stitutional Convention. But appearances can be deceiving. In fact, 
limiting the mandate to uniform treatment makes eminent sense 
and does no harm to the principles championed in Philadelphia. 
To begin with, there is the importance of consistency. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that it considers the same basic princi-
ple—uniform treatment—to underlie the uniformity mandate of 
the Uniformity Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Port Pref-
erence Clause.234 As well it should, given the history recounted 
233  Of course, the notion of what counts as impermissible discrimination—just like 
the notion of what counts as commerce—can surely evolve over time to afford Con-
gress the necessary flexibility to address the needs of a changing nation. See infra Part 
VI. But the core principle that Congress must treat the states uniformly and fairly 
should endure. 
234  See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 83 n.13 (1983) (“Although the pur-
poses giving rise to the Bankruptcy Clause are not identical to those underlying the 
Uniformity Clause, we have looked to the interpretation of one Clause in determining 
the meaning of the other.”); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 
160 (1974) (“Our construction of the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity provision com-
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above. That same principle should also underlie the uniformity 
mandate of the Commerce Clause. Because the Port Preference 
Clause and the Uniformity Clause were both intended to be ex-
pressions of a single, general uniformity limitation on the power to 
regulate commerce,235 the nature of that generalized constraint, if it 
is recognized under the Commerce Clause, should reflect the na-
ture of the uniformity mandate under these other, narrower provi-
sions.236
ports with this Court’s construction of other ‘uniform’ provisions of the Constitu-
tion.”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900) (holding that the uniformity prin-
ciple articulated in a case interpreting the Port Preference Clause applies also to the 
Uniformity Clause “since the preference clause of the Constitution and the uniform-
ity clause were, in effect, in framing the Constitution, treated, as respected their op-
eration, as one and the same thing, and embodied the same conception”). 
235  As for the Bankruptcy Clause, Madison recognized that “[t]he power of estab-
lishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is . . . intimately connected with the regulation of 
commerce,” The Federalist No. 42, at 56 (James Madison) (Legal Classics Library 
1983), an observation echoed by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions, see 
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465 (1982) (“Distinguishing a 
congressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause from an exercise under 
the Bankruptcy Clause is admittedly not an easy task, for the two Clauses are closely 
related.”); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819) (“The bank-
rupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce . . . .”). 
236  Although the Naturalization Clause also contains an express uniformity limita-
tion, the Supreme Court has never had the occasion to interpret it. See Iris Bennett, 
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggra-
vated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1697–98 (1999). Early lower court 
decisions were inclined to treat the uniformity mandate of the Naturalization Clause 
as coextensive with the uniformity demanded by the Bankruptcy and Uniformity 
Clauses (that is, uniform treatment), but more recent cases have tended to read the 
naturalization mandate as a strict demand for uniform rules. See id. at 1705–20; cf. 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (dictum) (“Congress’ power is to ‘es-
tablish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.’ A congressional enactment construed so 
as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship re-
quirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this 
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”). The recent trend in the case law 
follows the work of several commentators who have argued that the Naturalization 
Clause—which was born exclusively out of a desire for uniform rules, rather than 
nondiscrimination, and which provides for “an uniform Rule,” rather than “uniform 
laws”—demands a stricter brand of uniformity than is required elsewhere in the Con-
stitution. See Bennett, supra, at 1719–20; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arro-
gation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. 
Rev. 591, 633–36 (1994) (arguing that Congress should not be able to incorporate 
state laws when exercising the naturalization power); Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the 
Naturalization Power, 64 Geo. L.J. 1007, 1017–18 (1976) (same). 
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Second, and more importantly, it makes good sense to give Con-
gress the discretion to decide whether or not to impose uniform 
rules, but not the discretion to discriminate among the states. The 
Framers sought uniform rules in the service of efficiency—to pre-
vent infighting and chaos in commercial regulations; that was the 
motivation for federalizing the commerce power. But, as the Su-
preme Court recognized as early as its landmark decision in Cooley 
v. Board of Wardens, to require uniform rules in every single as-
pect of commercial regulation would actually subvert efficiency.237 
After all, 
the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, contain-
ing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike 
in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform 
rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in 
every port; and some, like the subject now in question [rules for 
pilotage in local ports], as imperatively demanding that diversity, 
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.238
For subjects that fall within the latter category, where local condi-
tions vary substantially, it is more efficient to allow regulation at 
the local level than to forcefully impose a single, inflexible national 
standard. 
Thus, an uncompromising mandate for uniform rules would ac-
tually be inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention and with 
the desires that gave rise to the uniformity principle in the first 
place. The Cooley Court attempted to ameliorate this problem by 
creating separate legal rules to govern the two categories: in those 
areas that required a single, uniform rule, only Congress was em-
powered to regulate (and when it did act, it was required to impose 
uniform rules); but in those areas that were local in nature and did 
not necessitate a uniform federal rule, both the states and Congress 
possessed concurrent power to act.239
Under Cooley, the Court was the ultimate arbiter of the line be-
tween the two categories. But in Leisy v. Hardin, the first of the 
trilogy of liquor cases discussed above, the Court transferred the 
237  53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
238  Id. at 319. 
239  See id. 
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ultimate authority—the final say about whether uniformity (of 
rules) is desirable in any particular instance—to Congress.240 Thus, 
the Court allowed Congress to permit the states to enact nonuni-
form rules even in areas that, in the Court’s judgment, would seem 
to necessitate uniformity.241 As one early commentator recognized, 
the “significant and salutary effect [of Leisy] was to take constitu-
tional rigidity out of the commerce clause problem and substitute 
the flexible and adaptable will of Congress.”242 
That decision was perfectly sensible. It did not ignore the effi-
ciency rationale for the uniformity mandate; it simply recognized 
that the efficiency question is best left to Congress. There is, after 
all, no reason not to trust Congress to decide for itself whether a 
given situation calls for a nationally uniform rule or a series of lo-
cally tailored standards. Congress can be trusted to make these de-
cisions because, when the Framers were concerned about the need 
for uniform rules, it was the states that they distrusted. Giving 
Congress the option to impose uniform rules whenever it con-
cludes that it is in the best interests of the nation as a whole to do 
so will adequately ensure that the nation will never repeat the fail-
ures of the Articles of Confederation, pursuant to which Congress 
was powerless to stem the tide of divergent and inefficient state 
regulations. As Professor David Currie put it, “[i]t is difficult to 
understand why the federal interest in a free commerce, whether 
land or sea, is in need of protection from the action of the very 
body to whose care it is intrusted.”243 Currie further explained: 
In many instances there is utility in having federal laws corre-
spond with those of the state in which a transaction takes place; 
and because of the state interest in these matters, and the decla-
ration by Congress that uniformity is not of grave importance, 
240  135 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1890). 
241  See id. at 109–10. 
242  Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. 1, 6 
(1940). 
243  David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 158, 191. 
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even the Commerce Clause’s injunction of uniformity has been 
overridden.244
But when the Framers were concerned about the need for uni-
form treatment, it was Congress that they distrusted, not the states. 
The desire for uniform rules may have necessitated the federaliza-
tion of the commerce power, but a congressional commerce power 
carried with it the potential to be misused to discriminate among 
the states. The uniform treatment constraint was born of the desire 
to eliminate that potential. Thus, although it makes sense to give 
Congress the ultimate authority to determine whether to impose 
uniform rules, it makes absolutely no sense to give Congress the 
power to determine whether to treat the states equally. It was the 
desire to rid Congress of precisely that power that gave rise to the 
uniformity constraint in the first place. 
Whatever one thinks of the political safeguards of federalism as 
a general rule—the notion that the political process can be trusted 
to police the boundary between federal and state authority without 
judicial intervention245—that notion would seem to be inapplicable 
here.246 It is, after all, a fundamental tenet upon which all modern 
constitutional law is constructed that, where discrimination on the 
basis of a suspect classification is at issue, the political process can-
not be trusted to resolve the problem.247 When Congress uses the 
244  Id; see also Cohen, supra note 227, at 405 (“It would stand the Constitution on 
its head to invalidate general congressional approval of state regulation of a particular 
subject matter area on the basis of a prohibition protecting the states [from discrimi-
nation].”). 
245  See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A 
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 216 (1980); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544, 546 
(1954). 
246  In any event, in recent years, the political safeguards of federalism have not 
found favor with the Supreme Court. The Court has taken an active role in enforcing 
its understanding of the constitutional limits on the federal government. See, e.g., 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 552 (1995). 
247  See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); John 
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 145–48 (1980). Of course, with regard to individu-
als, not all forms of discrimination are constitutionally suspect, only those that single 
out for unfavorable treatment “discrete and insular minorities.” Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement to mandate 
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commerce power to discriminate between the states, the disadvan-
taged states—or the people thereof—cannot achieve adequate re-
dress through political channels.248 That was the very reason why 
the Framers felt compelled to insist on a uniformity constraint on 
the federal commerce power. 
D. Continuing Vitality 
For this reason, a uniform-treatment constraint on the com-
merce power made sense in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. But why should the Court bother to resuscitate it now, nearly 
a century after its unheralded demise? After all, the incessant re-
gional squabbles that characterized the founding era and provided 
the impetus for the uniformity constraint have faded with the pas-
sage of time. Still, regardless of whether we think that the uniform-
ity constraint makes sense today (I will explain below why I think 
that it does), mainstream non-originalist constitutional theory sug-
gests—as I have endeavored to demonstrate above—that it is a 
fundamental constitutional value. That alone is enough to establish 
at least a presumption that we should continue to honor it. The es-
heightened judicial scrutiny whenever a statute discriminates on the basis of a suspect 
classification—such as race—even when the statute seeks to benefit a minority at the 
expense of the majority. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 
(1995). Just as the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically intended to preclude dis-
crimination between races, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
491 (1989), the Uniformity and Port Preference Clauses were specifically intended to 
preclude discrimination between states. In a sense, statehood is a suspect classifica-
tion when it comes to the commerce and tax powers. The Framers felt that, without 
the uniformity constraint, the political process could not be relied upon to protect the 
interests of the minority states, just as “prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. at 152 n.4. 
248  Cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1988) (“Although Garcia left 
open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process 
might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth 
Amendment, the Court in Garcia had no occasion to identify or define the defects 
that might lead to such invalidation. Nor do we attempt any definitive articulation 
here. It suffices to observe that South Carolina has not even alleged that it was de-
prived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it was singled 
out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless.” (citing Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)). 
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sence of a constitutional theory, after all, is that it produces results 
by which we must abide, regardless of whether we would choose 
them if we were unconstrained by the Constitution.249
Even if we believe that it is sometimes acceptable in light of 
changed circumstances to abandon fundamental constitutional 
principles without formal constitutional amendment,250 there is no 
basis for doing so here. As noted above, the decline of the uni-
formity mandate was the result of sloppy decisionmaking by the 
Supreme Court, not a principled determination to abandon the 
elemental values of the founding generation. Nor has the principle 
of uniformity been swept away or rendered irrelevant by the fun-
damental changes in the constitutional order that took place 
around the time of the Civil War and the New Deal. 
The Civil War, and the amendments that followed it, may have 
given Congress more leeway to pass laws targeted at particular 
states—namely, the Southern ones—in light of the fundamental 
evils that were far more entrenched in those states than in the oth-
ers. But the Supreme Court has already acknowledged that fact by 
holding that, in light of these genuine differences in circumstances, 
Congress can restrict the geographic application of statutes passed 
249  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. 
Rev. 535, 537 (1999). 
250  Whether the core constitutional principles yielded by the text, structure, and his-
tory read at an appropriately general level should themselves be capable of radical 
change over time is a matter of some dispute among non-originalist constitutional 
theorists. Some scholars view constitutional law in common law terms, and believe 
that core principles can be altered if the change “is the product of an evolutionary 
trend and is supported by good arguments of policy or fairness.” David A. Strauss, 
What is Constitutional Theory?, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1999). Others have written 
of an informal amendment process that takes place outside of Article V in moments 
of “higher lawmaking” on the part of the people. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People: Foundations 266–95 (1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transforma-
tions 3–32 (1998). Other scholars, however, believe that the fundamental constitu-
tional principles—especially those involving the structure of government and the ver-
tical or horizontal allocation of power—are essentially inviolate in the absence of 
formal amendment. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 228, at 1247–48. Tribe notes that 
“[s]ome of the variables in architecture-defining sentences, such as ‘commerce’ in Ar-
ticle I . . . might have some evolutionary potential even if the basic architecture is 
deemed to have a fixed meaning.” Id. at 1247 n.89. On this theory, the scope of the 
commerce power can change, as can the contours of the uniformity principle, but the 
basic notion that Congress is empowered to regulate commerce and must do so in an 
even-handed manner cannot. 
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under the Civil War amendments.251 Thus, for example, the Voting 
Rights Act can target only those states with a history of racially 
discriminatory voting laws.252 But it is difficult to see why the Civil 
War era altered the right of the states to be free from unequal fed-
eral treatment in matters unrelated to the evils of discrimination 
against individuals or groups. Thus, the Uniformity Clause and the 
Port Preference Clause still have vitality in the postbellum era, and 
so too should the general uniformity limit on the commerce 
power.253 Indeed, the Court continued to recognize that limit after 
the ratification of the Civil War amendments.254
The New Deal represented an even more significant alteration 
of the balance between federal and state power, but not in a way 
that would seem to affect the nondiscrimination principle. The 
growth of the commerce power in that era was not explicitly or im-
plicitly conditioned upon or conceptually tied to the waning of the 
uniformity principle. Simply put, there was nothing that Congress 
attempted to do during the New Deal that could not have been ac-
complished while continuing to recognize the uniformity constraint 
on the commerce power. The New Deal gave Congress greater 
power to regulate on a nationwide basis, not greater power to dis-
criminate between states. Indeed, “greater national uniformity”—
in the sense of uniform rules, but therefore, by definition, also uni-
form treatment—was a “cardinal princip[le] of the New Deal.”255
251  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966). 
252  See id. Even if there were a uniformity constraint on Congress’s Civil War 
amendment powers, a law of this sort might still pass constitutional muster if it could 
be demonstrated that the problem that it seeks to resolve exists only in the targeted 
states. See infra Part VI. 
253  It is true that, due to the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation in The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17–19 (1883), of the power afforded to Congress by § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the commerce power has been the source of many fed-
eral civil rights laws. But those laws have in fact been drafted in geographically neu-
tral terms. Congress has not felt the need to target specific states or regions, but 
rather has imposed uniform rules of nondiscrimination. 
254  See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870). 
255  R. Shep Melnick, Federalism and the New Rights, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 325, 
337 (1996); see also, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 52, at 47–69; Owen J. Roberts, The 
Court and the Constitution 61 (1951) (discussing early judicial opposition to the New 
Deal: “Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popu-
lar urge for uniform standards throughout the country”); Richard L. Revesz, Special-
ized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1155 
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Thus, the abandonment of the uniformity principle is not justi-
fied either by a sensible, common-law-like evolution of constitu-
tional doctrine, or by the fundamental changes in the constitutional 
order that took place in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth cen-
turies. Even so, we might still inquire whether the principle is sim-
ply anachronistic. Perhaps, although the principle was neither 
thoughtfully abandoned nor cataclysmically cast aside in a great 
constitutional reordering, it is nonetheless unnecessary and out of 
place in twenty-first-century America—an archaic relic of the pe-
culiar world of the eighteenth century that is no more relevant to-
day than the powdered wig or the Third Amendment. 
I do not believe that it is. It is certainly true that, as our sense of 
a shared national identity has grown over the decades, the rampant 
regionalism of the eighteenth century has significantly cooled. But 
realism has by no means disappeared altogether, and indeed may 
well be rearing its ugly head once again. The most recent electoral 
college maps—and the incessant political rhetoric of “red state 
America” (the South and the Plains) and “blue state America” 
(the Northeast, the industrial Midwest, and the West Coast)—paint 
a chilling portrait of a nation once again strongly divided on geo-
graphic grounds.256 The prospect of regional discrimination of a 
type that seemed unthinkable twenty years ago is suddenly more 
plausible than it has been in decades. And even if this particular 
divide is just a minor flare-up, who is to say that the future will not 
bring worse? Years of inactivity will naturally cause a constitu-
tional value to atrophy somewhat, but if we therefore treat the uni-
formity principle as anachronistic and allow it to expire altogether, 
it will not be there for us when changed circumstances make it 
relevant once again. Those who do not learn the lessons of history 
are, as they say, condemned to repeat it. 
In any event, even if we could be sure that strict regional dis-
crimination is a permanent relic of the past, there would still be a 
great deal of potential for abuse in empowering Congress to legis-
late nonuniformly pursuant to the Commerce Clause. One lesson 
(1990) (noting that “one of the central New Deal justifications for the creation of ad-
ministrative agencies was their role in promoting the uniformity” of law). 
256  Indeed, the 2004 electoral college map bears a disturbing resemblance to the an-
tebellum divide between free states and territories and slave states and territories. 
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that we can learn from the Sports Protection Act discussed above 
is that, in today’s world, powerful lobbies can purchase an unfair 
advantage (or bring about a disadvantage) for a single state or 
group of states. The sponsors of the Sports Protection Act candidly 
admitted that they “agreed to grandfathering because [they] had 
no choice;” they could not muster the votes to pass the bill without 
appeasing powerful lobbies by exempting states that had already 
legalized sports betting or had already created sports-based lotter-
ies.257 That statutes like the Sports Protection Act benefit a minor-
ity of states at the expense of the majority, instead of vice versa, 
should not matter. The Framers may have been concerned primar-
ily with the tyranny of the majority of states, but the principle that 
they endorsed is a broader one. Because “[t]ime works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes,” a constitu-
tional “principle to be vital must be capable of wider application 
than the mischief which gave it birth.”258 The uniformity mandate is 
broad enough to prohibit all discrimination between the states, 
whether it takes the form of the North ganging up on the South, or 
the South and West ganging up on the North,259 or Virginia being 
favored over Maryland,260 or Nevada getting a special benefit de-
nied to the rest of the Union.261
Indeed, the likelihood of Congress granting a favor to a single 
state is, in some ways, greater now than it was at the time of the 
framing, as the states no longer participate directly in the choosing 
of federal officers. In the eighteenth century, federal senators were 
257  138 Cong. Rec. 12,976 (1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
258  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
259  See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
260  See supra note 101 (recounting Luther Martin’s concern that Congress would 
divert commercial traffic intended for Maryland to the ports of Virginia). 
261  See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85–86 (1983) (“Nor is there any indi-
cation that Congress sought to benefit Alaska for reasons that would offend the pur-
pose of the [Uniformity] Clause. Nothing in the Act’s legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended to grant Alaska an undue preference at the expense of other oil-
producing States.”); Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senators Bennett 
Johnston and James McClure (July 19, 1989), in Puerto Rico’s Political Status: Hear-
ings on S.712 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., pt. 1, 301, 301 (1989) 
[hereinafter Puerto Rico Hearings] (reading Ptasynski to preclude “a naked prefer-
ence for [a] state as a state,” even in the presence of differential economic condi-
tions). 
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chosen by their state’s legislature;262 today, of course, they are 
elected directly by the people.263 In the eighteenth century, many 
state legislatures chose their state’s slate of presidential electors; 
today, of course, the people elect the President (who is empowered 
to veto a discriminatory federal law).264 Thus freed of these mecha-
nisms that once forced it to answer directly to the states and that 
were intended in part to ensure that it acted in the interest of the 
states,265 today’s federal government can enact discriminatory laws 
that many, even most, states would oppose, without fear of adverse 
consequences.266 Again, the Sports Protection Act, which was 
passed over the vehement opposition of the disfavored states, pro-
vides a striking example. 
For these reasons, there is no justification for the Court’s aban-
donment of the uniformity constraint on the commerce power. 
When presented with the opportunity, the Court should disavow 
its recent pronouncements and return to the traditional under-
standing. Importantly, stare decisis does not counsel otherwise, for 
the Court need not overrule a single case in order to repudiate the 
modern rule. Although the Court has repeated its current position 
on many occasions, each of these statements has, in fact, been dic-
262  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. 
263  See U.S. Const. amend. XVII. 
264  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28–
33 (1892). 
265  Madison observed that 
[w]ithout the intervention of the state legislatures, the president of the United 
States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his 
appointment, and will perhaps in most cases of themselves determine it. The 
senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the state legislatures. . . . 
Thus each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its exis-
tence more or less to the favor of the state governments, and must consequently 
feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obse-
quious, than too overbearing towards them.  
The Federalist No. 45, at 80 (James Madison) (Legal Classics Library 1983). 
266  It is true that if the people of the disadvantaged states are upset by the law, they 
can show their displeasure at the ballot box. But the people of a state may not feel the 
same way about a law (such as one curtailing the state’s ability to raise taxes) that 
their state government does. Or they might not care enough about the law to base 
their congressional and presidential votes on it. And, of course, where Congress is ad-
vantaging a majority of states at the expense of a minority, the people of the minority 
states will not be able to effectuate change through voting even if they want to. This 
precise concern gave rise to the uniform-treatment mandate. 
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tum.267 Notwithstanding its clear and firm language, the Court has 
never squarely held that there is no requirement of uniform treat-
ment under the Commerce Clause. 
VI. CONSEQUENCES 
What would it mean, in practical terms, to revitalize the uni-
formity constraint on the commerce power? What would happen 
to the United States Code? 
If the courts were to recognize such a constraint, its contours 
would conform to the uniformity rules that have been developed 
under the Uniformity Clause, the Port Preference Clause, and the 
Bankruptcy Clause.268 Unfortunately, those rules are anything but 
clear. The Supreme Court to this point has failed to articulate a 
coherent doctrinal framework for determining uniformity.269 In-
deed, constitutional scholars disagree at the most fundamental 
level about whether the Court has promulgated a strict prohibition 
267 As explained above in Part IV, the statement in James Clark Distilling Co. that 
gave rise to the modern rule was clearly dicta. Currin v. Wallace also contains a pow-
erful rejection of the uniformity constraint, but that was a case in which the discrimi-
nation complained of was between various businesses within a single state, rather 
than between states. See 306 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1939). Morgan v. Virginia contains similar 
language, but that was a case invalidating a state law under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, rather than a federal law under the affirmative commerce power, and the lan-
guage appeared only in a concurring opinion. See 328 U.S. 373, 388–89 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Central Roig Refining Co. upheld a regional sugar quota sys-
tem, but only against a challenge brought by the government and producers of Puerto 
Rico. See Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 609–10, 615–16 (1950). 
The Court has long held that the uniformity constraint, at least under the Uniformity 
Clause, does not apply to Puerto Rico. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 
(1901). Hodel v. Indiana rejected the notion of a uniformity limit on the commerce 
power in the course of upholding a statute that was geographically neutral, though it 
had a disparate impact on the midwestern states. See 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981). Such a 
statute would clearly be constitutional even if the Court were to recognize the uni-
formity constraint. See infra Section VI.A. Finally, the discussion of the lack of a uni-
formity constraint on the commerce power in Railway Labor was also dicta; Railway 
Labor was decided under the Bankruptcy Clause, not the Commerce Clause. See Ry. 
Labor Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982). 
268  See supra Section V.C. 
269  See, e.g., Philip Joseph Deutch, Note, The Uniformity Clause and Puerto Rican 
Statehood, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 685, 707–08 (1991) (noting that the Court’s “decisions un-
der the Uniformity Clause” are characterized by the failure to “clearly explain the re-
quirements of the Uniformity Clause and the precise basis of [the] decision”). 
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against virtually all forms of unequal treatment or a flexible and 
permissive standard permitting all but the most egregious discrimi-
nation.270 As such, there has been a great deal of scholarly criticism 
of the Supreme Court’s uniformity decisions under those clauses, 
arguing that they are murky and insufficiently theorized,271 and 
that, to the extent that they do establish rules, they hold too mod-
est a view of the uniformity requirement.272
It is not my purpose here to evaluate and criticize existing uni-
formity jurisprudence under the Uniformity and Bankruptcy 
Clauses or to attempt to articulate a comprehensive theory of con-
stitutional uniformity. That project, while sorely needed, is well 
beyond the scope of this Article. My point in these pages is simply 
that courts should apply the constitutional uniformity rule, how-
ever it is ultimately constituted, to all regulations of commerce. In 
this Part, I draw upon the existing case law—however incomplete 
and unsatisfying it may be—in order to sketch out briefly the po-
tential consequences of doing so. To be sure, this Part raises more 
questions than it answers, but that is the whole point of this Arti-
cle—to resurrect fundamental constitutional questions that have 
long been forgotten. 
A substantial degree of flexibility characterizes the case law con-
fronting the uniformity rule. In accordance with the method of 
constitutional decisionmaking described above, the Court has al-
lowed the concept of uniformity to evolve over time in order to en-
sure that Congress does not find its hands unnecessarily tied when 
addressing problems never envisioned by the Framers. But the 
Court has never lost sight of the uniformity principle altogether 
and continues to cast a skeptical eye on laws that appear to dis-
criminate between the states as states. As such, recognizing a gen-
eralized uniformity limitation on the commerce power would not 
take an intolerable bite out of the United States Code. It would, 
270  Compare Puerto Rico Hearings, supra note 261, at 301, 301–02 (advocating a 
strict rule), with Statement of Professor Paul Gewirtz, in Puerto Rico’s Political 
Status: Hearings on S.712 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., pt. 1, 40, 
40–48 (1989) (advocating a loose standard). 
271  See, e.g., Claus, supra note 157, passim; Deutch, supra note 269, at 695–708. 
272  See, e.g., Koffler, supra note 99, passim; Lund, supra note 77, at 1193 (arguing 
that the Court’s recent decisions “leave[] the uniformity clause virtually an empty 
shell”). 
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however, call into question the constitutionality of the many stat-
utes like the Sports Protection Act that regulate explicitly along 
state lines. 
A. What the Uniformity Mandate is Not 
Because the Court has long since abandoned any notion of a 
constitutional mandate for uniform rules, revitalizing the uniform-
ity constraint on the commerce power would not call into question 
the constitutionality of the many federal statutes enacted pursuant 
to that power that incorporate state regulatory standards. For ex-
ample, federal law permits national banks to open new branches in 
a particular state only in accordance with that state’s laws govern-
ing the expansion and branching of state-chartered banks.273 These 
statutes engender nonuniform rules—as a result of variations in 
state law—but do not constitute nonuniform treatment. In enacting 
them, Congress has not discriminated among states, but rather has 
placed all of the states on equal footing. If Montana feels that 
Idaho is gaining an advantage because the incorporated Idaho 
branching rules are more favorable than the incorporated Montana 
rules, Montana can change its law, and federal law will change 
along with it. As such, this federal law is uniform in the constitu-
tional sense, not withstanding the resultant varying standards 
throughout the states.274
273  See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000) (“A national banking association may, with the ap-
proval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) 
Within the limits of the city . . . in which said association is situated . . . and (2) at any 
point within the State . . . if such establishment and operation are at the time author-
ized to State banks by the statute law of the State . . . by language specifically granting 
such authority affirmatively . . . and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed 
by the law of the State on State banks.”). Other federal exercises of the commerce 
power incorporating state law include, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (using state 
law to define “assimilated” federal crimes in federal enclaves); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1)(A) (2000) (incorporating state law crimes into the definition of RICO fed-
eral offenses); 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2000) (abolishing imprisonment for debt where 
state law does so); and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000) (adopting state remedies to sup-
plement federal civil rights remedies). 
274  See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 440 (1946) (upholding 
the constitutionality of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, an exercise of the commerce 
power that left the regulation of the insurance industry to the states). 
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Although the Commerce Clause does not require uniform rules, 
it does mandate uniform treatment, that is, nondiscrimination. 
Even so, most of the countless federal statutes on the books that 
can be said to, in some sense, discriminate between states in the 
course of regulating commerce would not fall victim to the uni-
formity limitation. The Supreme Court has proceeded with caution 
in this arena, and the mandate for uniform treatment is, in fact, 
quite narrow in its reach. In particular, there would be no constitu-
tional problem with laws that discriminate purely in effect. Grant-
ing subsidies to corn farmers,275 for instance, benefits Nebraska a 
lot more than it benefits Alaska. Although such a law is, in some 
sense, discriminatory, it is nonetheless uniform in the constitutional 
sense. 
This much was clear to the Framers. Before the Convention, 
opponents of a federal taxing power expressed concern that, 
because of the differences in the geography and economies of the 
several states, even uniform federal taxes would operate 
unequally.276 At the Convention, these concerns led the Framers to 
preclude all taxes on exports. As Oliver Ellsworth put it, “[t]he 
produce of different States is such as to prevent uniformity in such 
taxes. [T]here are indeed but a few articles that could be taxed at 
all; as Tob[acco] rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would be 
partial & unjust” insofar as they are grown only in the South.277 But 
that was as far as the Framers were willing to go. They surely 
recognized that, although the potential for regional discrimination 
in the operation of ostensibly uniform federal laws was perhaps 
most salient with regard to export taxes,278 the same concern was 
present with all forms of federal commercial regulation and 
275  See 7 U.S.C. § 608(1)–(3) (2000). 
276  See, e.g., 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 34 (“Mr. RUTLEDGE objected to 
the term ‘generally,’ as implying a degree of uniformity in the tax which would render 
it unequal.”); 5 id. (“Mr. LEE . . . contended that the states would never consent to a 
uniform tax, because it would be unequal . . . .”); 1 id. at 101 (noting Rhode Island’s 
objection to a federal power to impose import duties “[t]hat the proposed duty would 
be unequal in its operation, bearing hardest upon the most commercial states, and so 
would press peculiarly hard upon that state which draws its chief support from com-
merce”). 
277  2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 360; see also supra note 106 (discussing the Southern 
insistence on the Export Clause). 
278  See 2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 363 (Madison’s August 21 notes from the Con-
vention quoted George Mason as saying that “[t]he case of Exports was not the same 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
328 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:249  
 
 
of federal commercial regulation and taxation.279 But since creating 
a federal commerce power was essential in to saving the fledgling 
Union, the nation was just going to have to live with the discrimi-
nation that inheres even in the facially uniform exercise of it.280
After the Convention, many Anti-Federalists found this concern 
reason enough to oppose ratification. Luther Martin, for instance, 
lamented to the Maryland legislature that, notwithstanding the uni-
formity requirement, Congress was empowered to enact regula-
tions that would have a disparate effect on certain states: 
[T]hough there is a provision that all duties, imposts, and excises, 
shall be uniform,—that is, to be laid to the same amount on the 
same articles in each state,—yet this will not prevent Congress 
from having it in their power to cause them to fall very un-
equally, and much heavier on some states than on others, be-
cause these duties may be laid on articles but little or not at all 
used in some states, and of absolute necessity for the use and 
consumption of others; in which case, the first would pay little or 
no part of the revenue arising therefrom, while the whole, or 
nearly the whole, of it would be paid by the last, to wit, the states 
which use and consume the articles on which the imposts and ex-
cises are laid.281
with that of imports. The latter were the same throughout the States: the former very 
different.”). 
279  To take just one prominent example, the Southern delegates—whose states had 
no ship-building industry and relied on English boats for their shipping—feared that 
the Northern states would force through Congress a bill (like those already enacted 
by the New England states) requiring all American imports and exports to be carried 
in American-made ships. Such a bill would have greatly enhanced the Northern ship-
building industry at the expense of Southern exports to foreign nations. See 2 Far-
rand, supra note 79, at 450–53; Warren, supra note 60, at 579–80. 
280  Cf. 2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 450 (quoting Mr. Clymer’s comments that “[t]he 
diversity of commercial interests, of necessity creates difficulties, which ought not to 
be increased by unnecessary restrictions. The Northern & middle States will be ru-
ined, if not enabled to defend themselves against foreign regulations.”). 
281  1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 369. These concerns were echoed by many 
Anti-Federalists. For instance, William Grayson argued to the Virginia Ratification 
Convention: 
The best writers on this subject lay it down as a fundamental principle, that he 
who lays a tax should bear his proportion of paying it. A tax that might with 
propriety be laid, and with ease collected, in Delaware, might be highly im-
proper in Virginia. The taxes cannot be uniform throughout the states without 
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To some Anti-Federalists, the potential for mischief—for discrimi-
nation—inherent in such a power, even when constrained by a uni-
formity mandate, was simply too great. 
But, of course, the Constitution was ratified despite these con-
cerns, and the Supreme Court has long held, under both the Port 
Preference Clause282 and the Uniformity Clause,283 that the uniform-
ity requirement mandates only “geographic uniformity,” not “in-
trinsic uniformity.” In other words, the uniformity requirement 
do[es] not relate to the inherent character of the tax as respects 
its operation on individuals, but simply requires that whatever 
plan or method Congress adopts for laying the tax in question, 
the same plan and the same method must be made operative 
throughout the United States; that is to say, that wherever a sub-
ject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere 
throughout the United States, and at the same rate.284
There is indeed a potential for mischief here, as the Anti-
Federalists recognized. But that potential is a necessary evil, one 
that was recognized and accepted by the Framers. For better or for 
worse, disparate impact of this sort is an unavoidable consequence 
of nationwide regulation in a diverse country. The differential 
being oppressive to some[.] If they be not uniform, some of the members will 
lay taxes, in the payment of which they will bear no proportion. The members 
of Delaware will assist in laying a tax on our slaves, of which they will pay no 
part whatever. The members of Delaware do not return to Virginia, to give an 
account of their conduct. This total want of responsibility and fellow-feeling will 
destroy the benefits of representation. 
3 id. at 285; see also 3 id. at 215–16 (statement of James Monroe). For Madison’s re-
sponse, see 3 id. at 306–07. 
282  See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1884). 
283  See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83–106 (1900). 
284  Id. at 84; see also Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 80 (1908) 
(“It may be true that the regulation of interstate commerce by rail has the effect to 
give an advantage to commerce wholly by water and to ports which can be reached by 
means of inland navigation, but these are natural advantages and are not created by 
statutory law. The fact that regulation, within the acknowledged power of Congress to 
enact, may affect the ports of one State more than those of another cannot be con-
strued as a violation of [the Port Preference Clause].”); The Head Money Cases, 112 
U.S. at 594 (“Is the tax on tobacco void, because in many of the States no tobacco is 
raised or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits void, because a few States pay 
three-fourths of the revenue arising from it? The tax is uniform when it operates with 
the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”). 
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benefits that inure to some states from a law like this do not derive 
from political distinctions drawn on geographic lines; instead they 
result from genuine geographic differences among the states. 
Extending this principle to all regulations of commerce, laws 
that are more burdensome to some states than to others—such as, 
say, costly environmental constraints on coal mining—will be con-
stitutional as long as they do not treat the same object or activity 
differently in different parts of the country. Were the law other-
wise, Congress would be powerless, for it is impossible to ensure 
that every federal law will benefit all states equally. As the Court 
conceded long ago, “[p]erfect uniformity and perfect equality of 
[regulation], in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, 
is a baseless dream.”285
B. Discrimination on the Basis of Locality 
A more difficult question is presented by the “discrimination” 
that stems from laws that benefit a single locality, as opposed to an 
entire state. At first blush, case law suggests that such laws would 
not run afoul of the uniformity constraint. The Court recognized 
long ago that “there are many acts of congress passed in the exer-
cise of this power to regulate commerce,” such as “[t]he improve-
ment of rivers and harbors, the erection of light-houses, and other 
facilities of commerce” that of necessity benefit a locality within 
one particular state.286 Early critics of these laws contended that 
they violated the Port Preference Clause.287 But the Supreme Court 
has long held otherwise, even though they inure to the benefit of a 
single port.288 The Court has explained that, “what is forbidden is, 
not discrimination between individual ports within the same or dif-
ferent States, but discrimination between States.”289 Thus, the Port 
285  The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595. 
286  Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 
(1855). 
287  See, e.g., James Buchanan, Veto Message to the Senate (Feb. 2, 1860), in U.S. 
Senate Journal, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 114, 117 (“If the construction of a harbor or 
deepening the channel of a river be a regulation of commerce, . . . this would give the 
ports of the State within which these improvements were made a preference over the 
ports of other States, and thus be a violation of the Constitution.”). 
288  See Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 435. 
289  Id. 
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Preference Clause does not preclude acts that directly benefit one 
or a few ports of one state while “only incidentally injuriously af-
fect[ing] those of another.”290 What is prohibited is the categorical 
favoring of the ports of one state over those of another.291
It is not clear what relevance, if any, those early decisions under 
the Port Preference Clause should have in determining the mean-
ing of the general uniformity constraint on the commerce power 
today. It would surely be possible to extend these early cases to 
sanction all forms of commercial regulation that explicitly benefit 
or burden individual localities, so long as they do not benefit or 
burden entire states.292 But I believe that it would be improper to 
do so, as subsequent changes in the law have undermined those 
cases in important ways. 
Without even reaching the question of discrimination, a debate 
raged in the early Republic as to whether Congress’s enumerated 
powers extended to making improvements to commercial water-
ways.293 The Federalists, on the one hand, believed that both the 
Spending and Commerce Clauses authorized these laws.294 The 
290  South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 13 (1876). 
291  See Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 435 (“[I]n order to 
bring this case within the prohibition, it is necessary to show, not merely discrimina-
tion between Pittsburg and Wheeling, but discrimination between the ports of Vir-
ginia and those of Pennsylvania.”). 
292  That principle would look something like this: Because the uniformity constraint 
is concerned only with the categorically disparate treatment of the states, granting a 
benefit to (or imposing a detriment upon) a single locality is generally acceptable if it 
is a necessary byproduct of a legitimate effort to improve interstate commerce, as 
long as the distinction is not drawn along state lines. To give an admittedly far-fetched 
and silly hypothetical example, it would, on this principle, be permissible for Con-
gress, in an effort to support a slumping national tourist industry, to grant an excep-
tion to the endangered-species laws allowing the killing of a few endangered bison 
each year at the Billings Hunting Festival, so long as the exception did not apply to 
the rest of Montana. 
293  See President Monroe’s Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1817), in U.S. House 
Journal, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 15 (“A difference of opinion has existed from the 
first formation of our constitution, to the present time, among our most enlightened 
and virtuous citizens, respecting the right of Congress to establish such a system of 
improvement.”); see also Alan L. Blume, A Proposal for Funding Port Dredging to 
Improve the Efficiency of the Nation’s Marine Transportation System, 33 J. Mar. L. 
& Com. 37, 39 (2002). 
294  See Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 168–69 (1987); Blume, supra 
note 293, at 39. The Spending Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . to 
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Anti-Federalists and Jeffersonians, on the other hand, believed 
that neither clause extended this far.295
As a matter of original meaning, the Anti-Federalists may well 
have had the better argument. The delegates to the Convention re-
jected a proposal by Benjamin Franklin to specifically empower 
Congress “to provide for cutting canals where deemed necessary,” 
and they did so in part out of the fear of discrimination—the belief 
that it would be unfair to build a canal that benefits only one state 
when all states collectively would bear the expense of construc-
tion.296
But whatever the intent of the Framers, it became clear early on 
that such laws allowing Congress to provide for the improvement 
of commercial waterways were necessary to the economic devel-
opment of the nation. Thus, over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Court and Congress eventually reached a consensus view 
that laws of this sort were constitutional. As the commerce power 
had already developed teeth, and the spending power had not yet 
done so, the Court originally chose to ground these statutes in the 
authority of the Commerce Clause.297 This decision, however, pre-
sented a conundrum: as exercises of the commerce power, these 
laws were subject to the uniformity constraint of the Port Prefer-
ence Clause; yet they were necessary laws, and it was impossible to 
enact them in such a way that they would apply equally to every 
state. A lighthouse will, of course, rest in just one state. 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
295  See President Madison’s Veto Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 3, 
1817), in 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 469 (“The power to regulate commerce 
among the several states cannot include a power to construct roads and canals, and to 
improve the navigation of watercourses, in order to facilitate, promote, and secure, 
such a commerce, without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary im-
port of the terms.”); President Monroe’s Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1817), in U.S. 
House Journal, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 15; President Jefferson’s Message to Con-
gress (1806), in 16 Annals of Cong., 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14–15; Blume, supra note 
293, at 39. 
296  See 5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 57, at 543 (“Mr. SHERMAN objected. The 
expense, in such cases, will fall on the United States, and the benefit accrue to the 
places where the canals may be cut.”). Some of the Framers apparently believed, 
however, that such a specific enumeration was unnecessary, as this authority was in-
herent in the spending power. See 2 Farrand, supra note 79, at 529. 
297  See Blume, supra note 293, at 47–51. 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
2005] Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power 333 
 
 
When faced with this conundrum, the Court recognized that this 
type of “discrimination,” however unfortunate and however con-
trary to the spirit of the Convention, is simply unavoidable—a nec-
essary evil if we are to empower the national government to foster 
and protect interstate and international commerce. We cannot very 
well dig a canal in every state in the Union every time we realize 
the need for a new one in a single state or region. As important as 
it is, the antidiscrimination principle of the Port Preference Clause 
must be flexible enough to allow for reasonable and efficient gov-
ernance. Thus, the Court was forced to gut the Port Preference 
Clause in order to avoid effectively eviscerating an essential fed-
eral function.298
Today, however, we would think of laws of this sort as falling 
within the ambit of the spending power, rather than the commerce 
power.299 We now understand the spending power to encompass all 
expenditures of federal funds (as distinct from regulations), even 
expenditures for the purposes of improving commerce.300 There-
fore, contrary to what the Court believed in the nineteenth cen-
tury, modern understanding maintains that laws of this sort are not 
subject to the Port Preference Clause (or to the general uniformity 
constraint on the commerce power) at all.301 Today, there is, in fact, 
no conundrum, and it is not necessary to limit the Port Preference 
Clause in order to save an essential federal power. 
298  See Kansas v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (D.D.C. 1992) (observing 
that, as a result of the early case law, “the Port Preference Clause has been rendered 
almost a historical nullity,” and that there is “no case in which the Port Preference 
Clause has been used to strike down an act of Congress”), aff’d, 16 F.3d 435 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
299  See Blume, supra note 293, at 43. 
300  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 89, 91–
93 (2001) (explaining the modern understanding that the spending power is broad 
enough to cover expenditures designed to improve interstate commerce, such as the 
interstate highway system and the air traffic control system). 
301  The spending power is understood to be free from any sort of uniformity con-
straint. See id. (arguing that the Spending Clause, for good reason, empowers Con-
gress to favor individual states). This Article leaves to the side any questions that 
might arise when Congress purports to ground its nonuniform acts in the Spending 
Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause. For a suggestion that the spending power 
is also constrained by a uniformity requirement, see Laurence Claus, Budgetary Fed-
eralism in the United States of America, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 581, 581 (2002); Claus, 
supra note 157, at 536–48. 
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Because the nineteenth-century cases that limited the scope of 
the Port Preference Clause’s nondiscrimination mandate did so 
only out of a now-rejected perception of necessity, we should de-
cline to extend them to the generalized uniformity constraint on 
the commerce power.302 To do so—to interpret the Commerce 
Clause’s uniformity mandate to permit laws that regulate in geo-
graphic terms and explicitly favor (or disfavor) particular localities, 
as long as they do not favor (or disfavor) all localities within a par-
ticular state or states—would be to create an exception with the 
potential to swallow the rule and to eviscerate the fundamental 
constitutional principle. Congress could achieve the very same end 
and avoid the constitutional problems with the Sports Protection 
Act, for example, by affording the exception to Las Vegas, rather 
than to Nevada. But a discriminatory regulation of that sort should 
be no more permissible under the Commerce Clause than a law 
exempting all residents of New York City from the federal income 
tax would be permissible under the Uniformity Clause.303 Such laws 
discriminate on geographic grounds in precisely the way that the 
Framers feared.304 They should be subject to the same constitu-
tional scrutiny imposed upon laws that regulate along state lines.305
302  Indeed, even if it were necessary to employ the commerce power (rather than 
the spending power) to enact laws authorizing the construction of canals and light-
houses, and therefore also necessary to respect the restriction of the uniformity man-
date in the old Port Preference Clause cases, it would make little sense to extend 
those cases to all laws enacted pursuant to the commerce power. Although federal 
spending and construction, by their very nature, often have to favor one place over 
another, federal regulation does not. Regulations can easily be drafted to be applica-
ble throughout the Union. The unavoidable necessity for discrimination that charac-
terizes the spending issue is inapplicable to regulatory acts. 
303  In United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983), discussed in Section VI.C, in-
fra, the Supreme Court closely scrutinized under the Uniformity Clause a law that 
benefited certain localities in the state of Alaska, but not the state as a whole, thus 
distancing itself from the early Port Preference Clause cases and indicating that the 
uniformity principle can be violated by laws that favor particular localities. 
304  See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that Luther Martin’s motiva-
tion for proposing the Port Preference Clause was his fear that Congress would give 
preferences to Norfolk over Baltimore). 
305  Perhaps the most obvious example of a federal law that burdens, as opposed to 
benefits, a particular locality (much to the chagrin of an entire state), is the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000), § 10101(30) of which establishes 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the location for the nation’s only high-level nuclear 
waste repository. The courts, however, have held that statute to be an exercise of 
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C. The Scope of the Uniformity Mandate 
The troubling statutes are those that establish rules or standards 
that apply differently in different states or that treat some states 
(or localities) differently than others, while rendering the states 
powerless to remedy the inequality. Of course Congress can im-
pose environmental constraints on coal mining, but can Congress 
constrain West Virginia coal mining but not Illinois coal mining? 
Of course Congress can incorporate state branching rules into the 
federal bank regulatory scheme, but can Congress allow unlimited 
federal bank branching in Montana but not in Idaho? In general, I 
do not believe that it can. 
Because the uniformity principle is a mandate of geographic uni-
formity designed to protect against discrimination between the 
states, the Court has explained that distinctions drawn on the basis 
of geographic boundaries are highly suspect. Three cases—two de-
cided under the Bankruptcy Clause and one under the Uniformity 
Clause—articulate the Court’s current position, as best as it can be 
discerned. 
In the first of these cases, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases,306 the Court sustained the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute that regulated the reorganization of railroads in the Northeast 
and Midwest. The act did not appear to be uniform on its face; it 
applied only to railroad bankruptcies taking place within a specific 
seventeen-state region.307 Nevertheless, the Court noted that “[t]he 
uniformity provision does not deny Congress the power to take 
into account differences that exist between different parts of the 
country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically iso-
lated problems.”308 The statute was drafted to cover only an iso-
lated region because the problem of railroad bankruptcy was one 
that existed only in that region: 
Congress’s authority under the Property Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, rather 
than the Commerce Clause. See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1552–53 (9th Cir. 
1990). As such, this law, like other statutes regulating the use of federally owned 
property, is not subject to a uniformity mandate. 
306  419 U.S. 102, 160–61 (1974). 
307  See id. at 108 n.2. 
308  Id. at 159. 
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No railroad reorganization proceeding, within the meaning of the 
Rail Act, was pending outside that defined region on the effec-
tive date of the Act or during the 180-day period following the 
statute’s effective date. Thus the Rail Act in fact operates uni-
formly upon all bankrupt railroads then operating in the United 
States and uniformly with respect to all creditors of each of these 
railroads.309
As such, “the definition of the region does not obscure the reality” 
that the statute in fact applied to all railroad reorganizations in the 
nation.310
Subsequently, in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,311 
the Court struck down a federal bankruptcy statute that, by its 
terms, applied to only a single railroad operating in a single re-
gion.312 The Court reiterated its holding in the Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act Cases that Congress is empowered to tackle geo-
graphically isolated problems, but made clear that federal laws 
must apply uniformly wherever those problems are presented. The 
statute at issue in Railway Labor was unconstitutional because 
there were other, similar railroad reorganizations in progress in 
other states to which the statute did not apply.313 Congress had 
acted to protect the economies of the states in one region from the 
threat of a regional railroad bankruptcy,314 but had done nothing to 
address the similar threat being posed to the economies of other 
states in other regions by similar regional railroad bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.315
309  Id. at 159–60. 
310  Id. at 161. 
311  455 U.S. 457, 470–73 (1982). 
312  According to the Senate Report, the railroad in question was “a major rail sys-
tem in the midwestern United States, providing vital service to the States of Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, Tennessee, Colo-
rado, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Louisiana.” S. Rep. No. 96-614, at 1 (1980), reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1156, 1157. 
313  See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 470–71. 
314  See 45 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000) (finding that “a cessation of necessary operations 
of the Rock Island Railroad would have serious repercussions on the economies of 
the States in which such railroad principally operates”). 
315  Some of the language of Railway Labor suggests that the Court’s decision was 
driven less by concerns about geographic discrimination than by the fact that Con-
gress had singled out a lone railroad for special treatment. See 455 U.S. at 457 (“A 
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Finally, in United States v. Ptasynski,316 the Court rejected a Uni-
formity Clause challenge to a federal statute that taxed domesti-
cally produced oil, but exempted from the tax all “Exempt Alaskan 
Oil.” The Court explained that where, as in this case, Congress 
“frame[s] a tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classifica-
tion closely to see if there is actual geographic discrimination.”317 
Close scrutiny of the oil tax revealed no such discrimination. Al-
though the tax was framed in geographic terms, it was “not drawn 
on state political lines.”318 In fact, less than twenty percent of all oil 
produced in Alaska qualified as “Exempt Alaska Oil.”319 The ex-
empted oil was only that portion of Alaskan oil that was produced 
in such extreme and remote climates that it cost fifteen times more 
to drill for it.320 Congress feared that taxing oil from these remote 
outposts “‘would discourage exploration and development of res-
law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country if it applies only to one 
debtor and can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over 
that debtor.”). The Court’s focus on that fact was a product of scholarly research sug-
gesting that a principal motivation for the uniformity constraint on the bankruptcy 
power was the desire to put an end to the practice previously employed by some state 
legislatures of enacting private bankruptcy bills, a practice that fostered unfairness 
and corruption. See id. at 472; William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitu-
tion in the History of the United States 492 (1953). But see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, 
Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Mara-
thon, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 32–33 (arguing that “rather than preventing Congress 
from passing private bills, the uniformity requirement was intended to ensure that 
Congress enacted laws that were applicable across jurisdictions”). Because that moti-
vation did not underlie the uniformity constraint on the commerce and taxing powers, 
this aspect of Railway Labor is not particularly germane to the question at hand. Still, 
despite this language, on the whole, the Court’s decision in Railway Labor is best un-
derstood as an application of the geographic discrimination principle. What made the 
statute at issue nonuniform was not that it targeted a single railroad; instead, the stat-
ute was nonuniform because it targeted the only bankrupt railroad operating in one 
region of the country, but not the bankrupt railroads operating in other regions that 
presented similar problems. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 470. The statute 
was a naked preference for the midwestern states. See id. 
316  462 U.S. 74, 77, 85 (1983). 
317  Id. at 85. 
318  Id. at 78. 
319  See id. at 77. 
320  See id. at 78. 
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ervoirs in areas of extreme climatic conditions.’”321 The Court held 
that Congress 
had before it ample evidence of the disproportionate costs and 
difficulties—the fragile ecology, the harsh environment, and the 
remote location—associated with extracting oil from this region. 
We cannot fault its determination, based on neutral factors, that 
this oil required separate treatment. Nor is there any indication 
that Congress sought to benefit Alaska for reasons that would of-
fend the purpose of the Clause. Nothing in the Act’s legislative 
history suggests that Congress intended to grant Alaska an un-
due preference at the expense of other oil-producing States. This 
is especially clear because the windfall profit tax itself falls heav-
ily on the State of Alaska.322
In fact, noted the Court, Congress could just as easily have de-
scribed the class of exempt oil in nongeographic terms.323
At base, these cases reveal a Court wrestling with the proper 
balance between, on one hand, the need to allow Congress the 
flexibility to take into account the genuine geographic differences 
that pervade our vast nation, and on the other hand, the fear of un-
justified discrimination between states. One can certainly question 
whether the Court has, to this point, struck the right balance; it 
321  Id. at 79 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-817, at 103 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 642, 656). 
322  Id. at 85–86. 
323  Id. at 86. A recent decision of the Federal Circuit employed similar reasoning 
under the Port Preference Clause (though it did not cite or rely upon the Uniformity 
Clause cases). In Thomson Multimedia, Inc. v. United States, 340 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2158 (2004), the court rejected a Port Preference 
Clause challenge to the provisions of the Harbor Maintenance Tax that exempt com-
mercial cargo loaded or unloaded in Hawaii or Alaska from a federal ad valorem 
charge. See 26 U.S.C. § 4462(b) (2000). The court concluded that Congress neither 
intended nor brought about an actual preference for the ports of the exempted states. 
Thomson Multimedia, 340 F.3d at 1366. Rather, the exemption did nothing more than 
level the playing field and make up for the geographic isolation that makes Alaska 
and Hawaii disproportionately reliant on commercial shipping. See id. at 1364–66. 
The court concluded that the fact that the exemption mentions the states by name 
was of no matter, as the exemption could easily have been drafted in nongeographic 
terms to achieve the same effect. See id. at 1366 (“In essence, naming the states . . . as 
exempted merely served as a proxy for a complex formula defining excessive isolation 
causing a greater dependency on domestic cargo than that experienced by other 
coastal states.”). 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
2005] Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power 339 
 
 
may well be the case that these decisions give Congress too much 
leeway to achieve discriminatory results through crafty, geographi-
cally neutral drafting.324 In truth, the Court is still feeling its way to 
the proper equilibrium. 
But no matter how unclear and incomplete the uniformity cases 
may be—and they surely leave substantial play in the doctrinal 
joints325 (indeed, they do not even offer a clear statement of the 
level of judicial scrutiny to be applied326)—they do yield at least a 
basic blueprint of the current rule of uniformity as it would apply 
to the Commerce Clause. The rule would seem to be this: Congres-
sional acts enacted pursuant to the commerce power should be 
subject to some form of heightened scrutiny if they regulate in 
geographic terms, and, in particular, should be viewed with signifi-
cant skepticism if their regulatory scope is explicitly drawn along 
state lines. Unless Congress can present other compelling, nondis-
criminatory justifications for the differential treatment (and can es-
tablish the lack of reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives), 
these statutes should be upheld only if they were enacted to solve a 
localized problem that does not exist elsewhere in the nation, such 
that they could have easily been drawn in reasonable non-
geographic terms to achieve the same effect.327 Reviewing courts 
324  See Koffler, supra note 99, at 76; Lund, supra note 77, at 1206–08. 
325  See, e.g., Deutch, supra note 269, at 707–10 (noting that some scholars read Pta-
synski broadly as affording Congress significant discretion to address geographic dif-
ferences in its legislation, while others read the case more narrowly as precluding 
nearly all geographically nonuniform enactments). 
326  See Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax 
Legislation Constitutional?, 44 Tax L. Rev. 563, 591 (1989) (noting that Ptasynski 
“sends mixed signals” and concluding that “[p]erhaps all that can be said is that Pta-
synski suggests a level of scrutiny somewhat higher than that of traditional rational 
basis analysis, but still quite deferential”). 
327  Professor Tribe has read Ptasynski even more aggressively, to stand for the 
proposition that the Court will never “sustain a provision that was drawn specifically 
in terms of the political boundaries of a State.” Statement of Professor Laurence H. 
Tribe (Nov. 14, 1989), reprinted in Puerto Rico Hearings, supra note 261, at 36, 39. 
Moreover, according to Tribe, even if a statute is drafted in geographically neutral 
terms, it will be struck down if it lacks a neutral justification and its purpose and effect 
are to afford a naked preference for an individual state. See Letter from Professor 
Laurence H. Tribe to Senators Johnston and McClure, Enclosed Memorandum of 
Law (July 18, 1989), reprinted in Puerto Rico Hearings, supra note 261, at 301, 305. 
Tribe emphasizes that the uniformity principle should not be rendered an “almost 
meaningless invitation to artful legislative drafting.” Id. at 302. 
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should ensure both that these statutes were not adopted for im-
permissible purposes (that is, to favor or disfavor particular states) 
and that they do not treat similarly situated persons or objects dif-
ferently in different states.328
D. Applying the Uniformity Mandate 
To demonstrate this rule in a hypothetical scenario, imagine that 
Congress wants to use the commerce power to ameliorate the ef-
fects of a devastating hurricane in the Southeast. A federal bill 
providing for hurricane relief for Florida, perhaps by temporarily 
exempting all businesses in that state from costly environmental 
regulatory standards and employee-benefits rules, would be un-
constitutional: obviously, the hurricane could not have affected 
every business in the state of Florida, from Key West to Jackson-
ville. Use of the state boundary would operate as a naked prefer-
ence for a single state. But a bill providing relief to all Florida 
businesses harmed by the hurricane would likely be constitutional, 
so long as the hurricane did not also affect other states. Specifically 
naming Florida in the law would probably not matter, since the bill 
could easily have been drafted to the same end in geographically 
neutral terms—for example, “all businesses that suffered substan-
tial hurricane damage.” But if Georgia and South Carolina were 
also ravaged by the hurricane, a bill targeting only Florida busi-
nesses would be unconstitutional. 
And finally, if, during the same time frame, Kansas had also ex-
perienced a spate of powerful tornados, the hurricane relief bill 
would not be unconstitutional for failing also to provide relief to 
Kansas businesses that had suffered tornado damage. In a post-
Lochner world, the Court should allow Congress substantial lee-
way in the level of abstraction at which it defines the problem that 
it seeks to solve (i.e. “hurricane” rather than “all natural disas-
ters”),329 as long as that level is sensibly targeted to genuine differ-
328  By contrast, statutes that apply on their face to the entire country, but operate in 
effect more harshly or favorably in particular states, should pass constitutional muster 
as long as Congress had a rational basis for enacting them. 
329  See generally Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (noting that the “Consti-
tution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in 
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ences in circumstances.330 Because the uniformity principle does 
not, and cannot, require absolute equality of benefits, the courts 
should afford significant deference to Congress in defining the 
scope of the problem that it chooses to address. 
Despite this deference and flexibility, however, there are a num-
ber of federal statutes enacted pursuant to the commerce power 
that would be suspect under this rule. Consider, for instance, 
ERISA section 514(b), which exempts Hawaii from the full scope 
of ERISA preemption.331 Congress enacted section 514(b) in re-
sponse to a judicial decision holding the Hawaii Prepaid Health 
Care Act332 preempted by ERISA.333 “[A]fter lobbying by the Ha-
waii Congressional delegation and certain state officials,”334 Con-
gress concluded that the preemption of the Hawaii statute had 
been “inadvertent” and retroactively exempted it by name from 
ERISA’s broad preemptive force.335 This favorable treatment was 
afforded only to Hawaii. As the House Conference Report ex-
plains, “[t]he provision states that it is not to be considered a 
precedent for extending non-preemption to any other State law.”336 
Such a naked preference is highly suspect, and would be unlikely 
to survive heightened judicial scrutiny. 
While the basic contours of the uniform-treatment requirement 
are clear enough, the clarity quickly breaks down at the margins. A 
difficult subcategory of federal statutes that single out particular 
states or regions for favorable treatment includes the many federal 
laws that include “grandfathering” provisions that exempt certain 
pre-existing state laws from the regulatory scope of a new federal 
law as though they were the same,” and that the Constitution allows a state legislature 
“to write into law the differences between agriculture and other economic pursuits”). 
330  Thus, the Uniformity Clause does not require Congress to tax tobacco at the 
same rate as wheat, even though one could imagine a single, uniform “crop tax.” It 
does, however, preclude Congress from taxing North Carolina tobacco at a different 
rate than Virginia tobacco. 
331  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (2000). 
332  Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 393-1 to -51 (Michie Supp. 2004). 
333  See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 706–07 (N.D. Cal. 1977), 
aff’d, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 454 U.S. 801 (1981). 
334  Council of Haw. Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F. Supp. 449, 451–52 (D. Haw. 1984). 
335  See S. Rep. No. 97-646, at 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4595. 
336  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-984, at 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4598, 
4603. 
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act. For instance, the Internet Tax Freedom Act precludes all state 
taxes on Internet access, but exempts those state taxes already in 
place when the statute was enacted.337 Similarly, the Privacy Act of 
1974 precludes the states from requiring individuals to disclose 
their social security numbers in order to receive a government 
benefit or exercise a right, but exempts those states that already 
require disclosure as a condition of voting.338 These statutes, by af-
fording special treatment to certain states and by regulating along 
clear state lines, are constitutionally suspect. 
The Sports Protection Act discussed above falls into this cate-
gory of constitutionally suspect statutes. If one accepts the thesis of 
this Article—that Congress is constrained in all exercises of the 
commerce power by a requirement to legislate uniformly—then 
the Sports Protection Act is in serious trouble. It regulates along 
state lines and exempts certain states from its scope, yet the prob-
lem that it addresses—sports gambling—is not “geographically iso-
lated”;339 even Congress admitted that the problem was national in 
scope.340 Indeed, if Congress is correct that sports gambling is an 
evil to be eradicated, it is surely a bigger problem in Nevada, where 
it is entrenched, than it is in Utah. If the uniformity principle is to 
mean anything, Congress cannot offer as an excuse for discrimina-
tion the fact that a law might be more palatable to the people of 
one state than those of another, or that the lobbies of particularly 
strong states will not stand for passage of a nationwide regula-
tion.341
The only geographic distinction between the exempted states 
and the covered states was the variation in existing state laws at the 
time that Congress took up the issue. That difference was not one 
in the nature or scope of the problem sought to be remedied; it was 
simply a difference in the way in which the states had, to that point, 
337  Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)). 
338  See McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2000). 
339  Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974). 
340  See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556 
(“Sports gambling is a national problem.”). 
341  Nor can Congress avoid constitutional scrutiny by recasting its intent as “stop-
ping the spread of X to other states,” rather than “stamping out X.” The uniformity 
principle requires that X be treated in the same manner everywhere that it occurs. 
COLBYBOOK 3/16/2005 11:33 PM 
2005] Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power 343 
 
 
chosen to deal with the problem. This is a classic example of grand-
fathering. Statutes of this sort take into account differences in state 
law, but they are an altogether different animal from federal stat-
utes that incorporate state laws, such as those that were upheld 
around the turn of the century when the Court abandoned any pre-
tense of a mandate for uniform rules. Unlike statutes that incorpo-
rate state law, grandfathering statutes do not afford all of the states 
the same regulatory options. Only those states that were grand-
fathered in can avoid the federal law. The other states are forever 
denied that option. 
Grandfathering is surely a defensible reason for differential 
treatment. It hardly smacks of favoritism that Congress would want 
to exempt from the scope of new federal statutory schemes states 
that had already relied on the lack of federal regulation.342 Because 
laws of this sort take as their starting point genuine differences in 
state law, they are less problematic than naked preferences granted 
out of the blue. Yet the fact remains that they place some states at 
a permanent disadvantage. And in doing so, they violate the core 
constitutional principle of geographic uniformity—the principle 
that a federal law must treat the same problem in the same manner 
in every state in which it exists. As such, it is questionable whether 
most grandfathering laws (except, perhaps for phase-out laws de-
signed to give states time to adjust to new federal regulations) 
would pass constitutional muster. 
An interesting test case for grandfathering as a justification for 
nonuniformity is presented by the provisions of the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”)343 that afford special privileges to the state of California. 
The CAA generally prohibits the states from enacting their own 
motor vehicle emissions standards, but it provides that the EPA 
can waive preemption for states that controlled auto emissions 
prior to March 30, 1966.344 As Congress was well aware, California 
342 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559 
(“Neither has the committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada, which 
over many decades has come to depend on legalized private gambling, including 
sports gambling, as an essential industry, or to prohibit lawful sports gambling 
schemes in other States that were in operation when the legislation was introduced.”). 
343  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
344  42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b) (2000). 
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is the only state that meets this condition.345 Thus, California—and 
only California—is entitled to promulgate its own set of emissions 
standards, as long as they meet with EPA approval. And the CAA 
goes even further: Not only does it leave California free to set its 
own standards, it also provides that all of the other states can 
choose to employ the California standards, in lieu of the federal 
ones.346 Thus, the CAA affords forty-nine states a limited choice: 
comply with federal law or comply with California law.347 Only 
California is empowered to set its own standards. Only California 
is granted, in the words of one House Report, “the broadest possi-
ble discretion in selecting the best means to protect the health of its 
citizens and the public welfare.”348
This is an egregious example of discrimination among the states 
that goes well beyond run-of-the-mill grandfathering provisions, 
both because it gives California the ongoing ability to craft new 
rules and regulations (rather than simply preserving its preexisting 
regulations), and because it allows California to set secondary, 
quasi-national standards that can be adopted by other states. 
Yet Congress had sound reasons for choosing this path. As the 
House Report explains, “California was afforded special status due 
to that State’s pioneering role in regulating automobile-related 
emissions, which pre-dated the Federal effort. In addition, Califor-
345  See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 281, 292–93 (2003). 
346  42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000) allows states to employ standards other than the federal 
ones only if, inter alia, “such standards are identical to the California standards for 
which a waiver has been granted for such model year.” See also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e) 
(2000), which preempts regulation of nonroad engine emissions, but authorizes Cali-
fornia (by name) to promulgate its own standards, and permits the other states to 
choose to employ the California standards in lieu of the federal ones. 
347  See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000) (“Nothing in this section . . . shall be construed as 
authorizing any such State . . . to take any action of any kind to create, or have the ef-
fect of creating, a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine different than a motor vehi-
cle or engine certified in California under California standards (a ‘third vehicle’) or 
otherwise create such a ‘third vehicle.’”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 310 
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1389 (“States are not authorized to 
adopt or enforce standards other than the California standards.”). 
348  H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1380–81; see also id at 301, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1380. (“In general, 
the Environmental Protection Agency has liberally construed the waiver provision so 
as to permit California to proceed with its own regulatory program in accordance with 
the intent of the 1967 Act.”). 
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nia’s air pollution problem was then, and still appears to be, among 
the most pervasive and acute in the Nation.”349 What is more, as 
Professor Carlson has explained, choosing to exempt California—
and to empower it to set standards that other states may follow—
represents a creative form of modified cooperative federalism: 
Congress attempted to take advantage of the particular compara-
tive advantages that [California] has in managing an environ-
mental problem, while maintaining a strong national role. In the 
case of mobile source emissions, uniform regulation seems obvi-
ously desirable. The prospect of fifty separate standards for 
automobiles is untenable. But California has unique air pollution 
problems and an economy large enough to support separate 
standards. Congress quite creatively attempted to capitalize on 
California’s comparative advantages by privileging its status un-
der the Act. The result is that California can experiment and lead 
the way in forcing clean air technology while otherwise ensuring 
uniform national standards.350
Professor Carlson outlines a number of ways in which this system 
might well lead to greater innovation in environmental protection 
than would result either from affording similar regulatory authority 
to all fifty states, or from denying that authority to any of them.351
The ultimate question is whether California’s unique situation 
with regard to air pollution, and the unique benefits that may flow 
to the entire nation as a result of affording California this special 
privilege, are significant enough to justify the full extent of the dif-
ferential treatment. I take no position here on the proper answer to 
that question. My point is only that the courts should be asking the 
question, but have not been doing so. 
Finally, leaving aside grandfather clauses and other exemptions 
from federal laws, at least two other categories of congressional 
acts that would raise concerns under the uniformity constraint ex-
349  H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 301 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1380. 
See also Carlson, supra note 345, at 311 (“By exempting the state from preemption, 
the CAA has also bolstered California’s longstanding leadership in regulating mobile 
source emissions; the state is probably unique in the country in the amount of exper-
tise and sophistication it has developed in the regulation of auto emissions.”). 
350  Carlson, supra note 345, at 313–14. 
351  See id. at 311–18. 
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ist: laws targeting particular geographic regions and laws establish-
ing state-based quotas. 
In the former category are statutes such as 46 U.S.C. § 8104, 
which limits the number of number of work hours per day of em-
ployees on towing boats, but only those towing boats “operating on 
the Great Lakes, harbors of the Great Lakes, and connecting or 
tributary waters between Gary, Indiana, Duluth, Minnesota, Niag-
ara Falls, New York, and Ogdensburg, New York.”352 If a statute of 
this sort is to survive judicial scrutiny, it must be the case that Con-
gress was responding to a problem unique to the regulated region. 
In the latter category are statutes like the provisions of the Agri-
culture Adjustment Act that call for state-by-state production quo-
tas for crops such as tobacco, wheat, and cotton.353 Such quotas 
would seem to be necessary in order to enforce a nationwide pro-
duction cap, but the courts should scrutinize them very closely to 
ensure both a lack of discriminatory motive and that the quotas are 
set on the basis of legitimate criteria that, as far as practicable, 
treat all of the states equally. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the law takes for granted a proposition that would have 
been shocking to the Framers—that Congress is free to use the 
commerce power to discriminate between the states. There is no 
satisfactory justification for abandoning the historical consensus to 
the contrary, and there are many reasons to revive it. As the com-
merce power has grown far beyond the scope originally contem-
plated by the Framers, if we are to do justice to a core constitu-
tional principle, it is more important now than ever before that we 
revitalize the uniformity constraint on the exercise of that power—
even if the Framers’ intention to mandate that constraint was, in 
hindsight, imperfectly expressed. 
 
352  42 U.S.C. § 8104 (2000). This statute was upheld forty years ago pursuant to the 
current rule that the Commerce Clause does not require uniform legislation. See 
United States v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 183 F. Supp. 644, 650 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff’d, 287 
F.2d 679, 679–80 (6th Cir. 1961). 
353  See 7 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000) (tobacco); 7 U.S.C. § 1434 (2000) (wheat); 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (2000) (cotton). 
